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ABSTRACT 
After the September 11 attacks, Honduras committed to support the 
GWOT, but priorities in national objectives other than terrorism have kept the 
Honduran government from developing a strategy and the necessary 
counterterrorism infrastructure to combat this emerging threat. This research 
examines current threats in Latin America and Honduras in particular. It also 
suggests a developmental strategy to enhance the country’s capabilities to 
combat terrorism by the employment of instruments of national power in a 
multidimensional way capable to prevent, deter, and respond to terrorist acts. 
This study uses a brief analysis based on the concepts of suitability, feasibility, 
and acceptability in order to identify the risk that the proposed strategy could 
incur. The study concludes by proposing a series of recommendations that 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
A. BACKGROUND 
There are few things that can create as deep a fear in society as terrorist 
violence. Terrorism has been employed at different levels since the beginning of 
history. In the same way that society has evolved, terrorism has evolved as well. 
Terrorism has become sophisticated and, in some circumstances, has gained 
legitimacy. 
Since the terrorist attack on the United States on September 11, 2001, 
and the following strikes in Madrid and London, the world has realized that 
terrorism has become an obvious topic of global concern. “The last two decades 
of the twentieth century saw the rise of extreme Islamic radicalism to levels that 
threaten regimes throughout the Muslim world, Asia, Europe, much of Africa, and 
America.”1   
Some countries immediately mobilized forces to protect themselves from 
further strikes, others mobilized means to support the U.S., and certain ones 
committed to engage in the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT). In Latin America, 
most countries condemned the 9-11 strikes and talks started to take place at the 
regional level in order to strengthen hemispheric cooperation against terrorism. 
Following the 9-11 attacks, the U.S. has focused its attention on the 
Middle East. However, a potential threat could emerge from a much closer 
source; its southern neighbors. Although Latin America has not been a focal 
point in the war on terrorism, countries in the region have struggled with domestic 
terrorism for decades, and international terrorist groups have at times used the 
region as the battleground to advance their causes.2 Recent intelligence reports 
suggest that Osama bin Laden and his associates are stacking their resources in 
                                            
1  Bolz Frank , Kenneth J. Dudonis, David P. Schulz, The Counterterrorism Handbook: 
Tactics, Procedures, and Techniques, Third ed. (Boca Raton, FL: Taylor & Francis Group, 2005), 
401. 
2  Mark P. Sullivan, Latin America: Terrorism Issues (Washington, D.C.: Congressional 
Research Service,[2006]). http://www.hsdl.org/homesec/docs/crs/nps21-07240617.pdf (accessed 
August 15, 2006). 
2 
South American countries that have clandestine financial networks based on 
drug trafficking, because the resources are beyond regulatory scrutiny.3  ”Ten of 
thirty terrorist organizations operating worldwide, including one linked to Osama 
bin Laden, are located or operate in Latin America.”4 The U.S has to understand 
that security and survival do not rely solely on a strong military power, but also 
depend on policies and programs that can strengthen international relationships. 
These would result in mutual cooperative efforts to face emerging challenges, 
from global context through continental, regional, and individual state. 
Throughout the periodic presidents’ reunions of the Summits of the 
Americas Process, responsibilities have been assigned to the Organization of 
American States (OAS) to promote a shared vision among the countries of the 
region. The OAS letter contains a chapter concerning “collective security,” which 
prescribes for the member countries the application of measures and procedures 
stated in the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (TIAR) establishing 
a continental system for collective security. Several declarations made during the 
Summits of the Americas have stated the new concept of hemispheric security, 
with an integral and multidimensional reach, thus including traditional threats, 
emerging threats, and other challenges. Throughout this declarative act it is 
recognized that the hemispheric security model has to be flexible and must 
include characteristics of each region and every state.5  
In 1995, the Summit of the Americas also incorporated the Ministers of 
Defense (MOD) conference which adopted security policies focusing on 
transparent measures for defense issues, peacekeeping operations, demining- 
operations, counter-drug trafficking operations, and the role of the military in the 
present century. In November 2002, during the fifth conference of MOD, the 
                                            
3  Graeme C. S. Steven and Rohan Gunaratna, Counterterrorism (Santa Barbara, Calif.: Abc-
Clio, 2004), http://ebooks.abc-clio.com/?185109671X.,124. 
4  Stephen Johnson, "U.S. Coalition against Terrorism should Include Latin America," 
Backgrounder, no. 1489 (2001). http://www.hsdl.org/homesec/docs/nonprof/nps12-011504-01.pdf 
(accessed February 8, 2006). 
5  Honduras, Secretaria de Defensa Nacional, ed., Honduras: Libro De La Defensa Nacional, 
1st ed., Vol. I (Tegucigalpa: Lithopress, 2006), 28-29. 
3 
signatories agreed to support the OAS and its Counterterrorism Inter-American 
Council’s (CTIAC) policies against terrorism.6  
The constitution of the Central American Integration System (SICA) that 
was adopted during the Summit of Central American Presidents in Tegucigalpa, 
Honduras on December 13, 1993, replaced the former Organization of Central 
American States (OECA), and now is recognized by all countries on the isthmus, 
including Panama and Belize. SICA’s fundamental objective is to have Central 
America become a region based on peace, liberty, democracy and development; 
furthermore, the integration, respect and promotion of human rights, and integral 
development of Central American states. On December 15, 1995, under SICA, 
the Central American Treaty of Democratic Security (CATDS) was signed and 
included in its letter the fight against institutional corruption and the introduction 
of the concept of security under an indivisible union of development, democracy, 
peace, and liberty.  
The Central American presidents called an emergency meeting in 
Honduras on September 19, 2001. At this meeting, on behalf of the Central 
American population, they condemned such terrorist attacks and agreed to 
support President Bush’s declarations against international terrorism; support the 
UN resolution 1368 in order to apply justice against the perpetrators of the 9-11 
terrorist attacks; agreed to join their countries within the OAS in conferences to 
discuss themes such as “terrorism as a threat to democracy and hemispheric 
security.” The presidents also made a commitment to improve information 
sharing systems; reinforce border, marine port, and airport security; control 
immigrant flow; deny their territories to terrorist organizations’ operations; call up 
a Central American Security Council emergency meeting in order to look up and 
                                            
6  V Minister of Defense Conference, 5th sess., (January 28, 2003): 1-18. 
http://www.defensa.cl/paginas/public/noticias/2003/28.01.2003Oea.pdf (accessed August 21, 
2006), 10-11. 
4 
evaluate regional actions against terrorism; and offered the commitment of the 
Central American Humanitarian and Rescue Unit to the U.S.7  
Honduras has not yet committed to any bilateral agreement to combat 
terrorism. In 1954, Honduras and the U.S. ratified the bilateral agreement for 
military aid, in which both countries agreed to commit military resources for 
common defense and to maintain a peaceful and secure environment in the 
Western Hemisphere. Based on this agreement, the U.S. agreed to provide the 
necessary equipment, training, personnel, and funds in order to upgrade the 
Honduran military capabilities. In return, Honduras agreed to provide the raw 
materials, personnel, proper employment, and security of the military aid 
provided y the U.S. in fulfillment of UN international accords.8 There are several 
protocols in place expanding the 1954 agreement, which include U.S. military 
bases, radar emplacements, and combined joint exercises in Honduras’ territory. 
 
B. THE NATURE OF THE STUDY 
Even though the government has conveyed its intention of cooperating in 
the GWOT, Honduras lacks a national security strategy to achieve this 
cooperation. The underlying purpose of this study is to formulate such a strategy 
and conduct an analysis to examine a small handful of policy options to 
determine which option can best align with Honduras’ national objectives and 
support international efforts to combat terrorism. Moreover, it will delineate what 
the threats to Honduras are, what the approaches that seek to reduce those 
threats are, and how the U.S. may take part in a strategy for creating a 
cooperative environment in the GWOT. 
The Honduras’ National Security Strategy to Combat Terrorism will be the 
comprehensive direction of power to control situations and areas in order to 
achieve national objectives. The formulation of such a strategy will be based on 
                                            
7  Central America Unified Against Terrorism, 1, Extraordinary Declaration. (September 19, 
2001), 1-3. 
http://www.sieca.org.gt/publico/Reuniones_Presidentes/ExtraordinariaX/declaracion.htm 
(accessed  August 21, 2006). 
8  Convenio Bilateral De Ayuda Militar, (15 de febrero de 1954, 1954). 
http://www.sre.hn/tratados/militares/TD312.rtf (accessed April 27, 2006). 
5 
how (strategic concepts) the government will employ the instruments of national 
power (diplomatic, informational, military, and economic) as the resources 
available to the state to exercise control over sets of circumstances and 
geographical locations to achieve the national objectives (ends) in cooperation or 
in competition with other actors pursuing their own objectives.9  
The information used to formulate this strategy comes from primary and 
secondary source material, international accords, reports, and personal 
interviews with key personnel of the Honduran government. The personnel 
interviewed include the Honduran Vice-President, the Chairman of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff of the Honduran Armed Forces, The Honduran Army 
Commandant, several Honduran congressmen, and several midlevel government 
officials. 
   
C. ORGANIZATION OF THESIS 
This thesis is organized in five chapters. Chapter II provides an historical 
overview along with a discussion of the emerging threats in Latin America. 
Although the time frame for this study is focused on the recognition of 
transnational terrorism since the 9-11 attacks in Washington and New York, for a 
more accurate study it is important to review the historical context of Latin 
America in order to understand the potential postures of governments in Latin 
America and the effects of U.S. foreign policy on the region. This chapter also 
presents a suggested definition of terrorism and the basic terminology used. It 
also discusses the impact of drug trafficking, gangs, organized crime, and the 
potential threat of terrorism in Latin America and focuses special attention of 
Honduras. 
Chapter III suggests the formulation of Honduras’ National Strategy to 
Combat Terrorism. It is known that a strategy formulation is a process that has to 
proceed year after year, so that advances in technology can be absorbed, 
                                            
9  Richard Yarger, "Towards a Theory of Strategy: Art Lykke and the Army War College 
Strategy Model," U.S. Army War College. http://dde.carlisle.army.mil/authors/stratpap.htm; 
(accessed June 10, 2006),1-2. 
6 
account taken of the changing geopolitical environment, and the budget matched 
to the availability of funds.10 There are two levels of strategy: operational and 
developmental. Strategies based on existing capabilities are operational 
strategies which require specific plans for action in the short range period. 
Longer-range strategies may be based on estimates of future threats, objectives, 
and requirements. These longer-range strategies are more often global in nature 
and may require improvements in current capabilities.11 This thesis will be 
focused on developmental strategy. It is important to understand that Honduras’ 
national objective priorities have not been based on terrorism and its 
circumstances; therefore, Honduras has not yet developed a strategy to combat 
terrorism. The lack of this strategy emphasizes the relevance of this thesis.  
Chapter IV provides a list of existing facts and assumptions of the 
Honduran context which will assist in analyzing this developmental strategy. 
Then the strategy is analyzed trough the variables of suitability, feasibility, and 
acceptability in order to find an appropriate balance of objectives, strategic 
concepts, and resources with the aim of reducing risk. Moreover, the analysis 
also provides certain recommendations that would make such a strategy 
appropriate to prevent, deter and respond to any terrorist threat in Honduras. 
Chapter V provides conclusions and recommendations that might be 
helpful for decision makers considering the evolution of the Latin American 
environment, current trends, the potential threats of terrorism, as well as policies 
in play to improve the formulation of strategies to counter transnational terrorism.  
                                            
10 Robert F. Grattan, The Strategy Process (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002), 155. 
11 Joseph R. Cerami and James F. Jr. Holcomb, eds., U.S. Army War College Guide to 
Strategy (Carlisle: U.S. Army War College, 2001), 218. 
http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/army-usawc/strategy/index.htm (accessed July 12, 2006), 
180. 
7 
II. EMERGING THREATS IN LATIN AMERICA 
The previous chapter presented the background for the study, the nature 
of the study, and how it will be presented. This chapter provides the theoretical 
framework and theoretical precepts for the study. The chapter also addresses an 
historical evolving environment in Latin America, and points out the emerging 
threats in the region.  
Historically, Latin America has struggled with traditional threats including 
international territorial disputes, ideological revolutions, poor economic 
performance, and social structure problems have been the Achilles’ heel for this  
region. Foreign countries have made the mistake of treating Latin America as a 
single region. However, Latin America shares common roots and influence from 
Spain and Portugal, different ethnic cultures, different institutional evolution and 
development including specific problems that are not shared among the countries 
in the region, makes the region a composition of individual nation-states. 
Problems in Central America look different from those in South America, and not 
all countries in Latin America share the same modernization and development 
levels. 
After the Cold War, ideological issues were displaced to a second stage.  
Democratic regimes were reestablished, military forces were sized down and 
economic reforms became the principal concerns in the region. The beginning of 
the “twenty first century” has been a period of momentous change worldwide, 
changes that are part of an epochal shift, of a complete reorganization of social 
structures worldwide known as globalization, have emerged as a transnational 
stage. So far, these changes have not cause the improvement of 
microeconomics in Latin America because they have been focused on assuring 
macroeconomic stability. Therefore, internal social cohesion has declined along 
with national economic integration.12 The lack of microeconomic performance 
has divided even the deeper the social structures in Latin America, making the 
gap bigger between local dominant groups and the lower classes. This gap has 
                                            
12  William I. Robinson, Transnational Conflicts (New York: Verso, 2003), 10, 46. 
8 
allowed threats such as drug trafficking, gangs, and organized crime to emerge, 
and now the Latin American governments are having to employ national security 
resources to control these problems. At this time while Latin America is struggling 
to control new internal threats, terrorism, which is now transnational, could exploit 
these domestic problems to infiltrate into Latin America. What is even worse is 
the possibility of them blending with the domestic threats with the intention of 
reaching their own goals. 
 
A.  THE EVOLVING LATIN AMERICAN ENVIRONMENT 
Culture in “ancient” America was based in two major locations. In Mexico 
and Central America were the Aztecs and the Mayas, and in Peru were the 
Incas, where advanced civilizations fought the atrocities of the Spanish 
“conquistadores.” The conquistadores had been delegated powers by the 
Spanish monarchy to found an empire in America, which later generated deep 
resentments against foreign occupation. 
In the early eighteenth century, most Latin American countries became 
independent from Spain and developed unionist efforts that did not succeed due 
to marked differences between the countries. Once Spain represented no threat 
to the area, the aspiring imperialist U.S. started seeking territorial control over the 
former European colonies, preventing other powers from challenging the U.S. 
span of control, and supporting Latin American independence campaigns with 
the aim of establishing hegemony within the region. The U.S. established the 
Monroe Doctrine, which considered any attempt from Europe to extend European 
control to any portion of the Western Hemisphere as dangerous to the peace and 
safety of the region. In 1982, the Malvinas War between Argentina and England 
cast doubt on the Monroe Doctrine. In this conflict the U.S. supported England. 
This support revealed the clear intentions of the U.S. and focused on the U.S.’s 
own interests in the hemisphere regardless of the Monroe doctrine and the Inter-
American Reciprocal Assistance Agreement (TIAR). 
After WWII, the Soviet Union attempted to spread communism in all 
directions, based on the “Theory of Revolutions,” which focused on social and 
9 
political changes theory focused on social and political changes. The attempt of 
the Soviet Union, added to the history of interventions in Latin America, created a 
vulnerable environment for the region’s stability. Therefore, a lack of harmony 
between the continent’s social systems and the political systems and the 
downturn that the U.S.’s foreign policy created were the leading reasons for the 
creation of the revolutionary movements in Latin America. Moreover, interest in 
guerrilla warfare grew following the success of Fidel Castro in Cuba, and the 
tactics of guerrilla warfare were translated to internal wars rather than external 
wars against foreign occupiers. 
In order to stop communism from spreading in Latin America, for almost 
three decades the U.S. foreign policy supported the establishment of military 
governments in the hemisphere. They easily achieved a consensus on the need 
to unite against a shared security threat. The U.S. focused its attention on the 
region and provided strong foreign aid, heavy in military assistance, with the 
intention of rebuilding the countries’ counterinsurgency capabilities to control 
their internal situations and protect the U.S. interests in the region. These military 
governments completely controlled the national tools of power with the intention 
of denying all possibilities of success to the communist insurgents. However, 
some military leaders took advantage of this environment to establish 
dictatorships that worsened the internal situations of those countries and 
provided stronger reasons for the insurgents’ cause and sustained the 
mobilization of popular support. These ideological struggles in Latin America 
generated terrorist actions from both sides, government and insurgents, 
characteristic of this struggled context and which imported similar strategies from 
other parts of the world.  
During these decades of political and social struggles, some countries in 
the region found that transitioning from military governments to democratic 
regimes would be part of the strategy that would help to stabilize the internal 
situation; furthermore, “the fall of the Soviet Union altered the context in which 
10 
both Washington and Latin America operate.”13 Once the communism threat in 
the region was not a threat to U.S. interests, the U.S. started to suspend most 
military assistance to Latin America in order to size down the military apparatus 
in the region. This was a part of the U.S.’s strategy to consolidate efforts so it 
could reach its goal of being a “global power.” Thus, the military, as a tool of Latin 
American countries’ national power, became useless to support the U.S.’s 
interests and exposed Latin American security issues to a new trend of emerging 
threats.  
Two major trends have altered the security issues in Latin America. One, 
the failure of neoliberalism in Latin America has worsened social problems. Two, 
the “increased preoccupation of the U.S. with terrorism as the premier security 
threat”14  which will be addressed further ahead in this chapter. 
Latin America seemed poised to begin a virtuous cycle of economic 
progress and improved democratic governance overseen by a growing number 
of centrist technocratic governments. Since there are certain obvious ties 
between economics and security, there could be speculations that disappointing 
economic performance might impact several factors of security interest such as: 
weakened democracies, economic suasions available to criminals and terrorists 
to undermine security operations, military and security forces that are less 
capable of addressing threats and more susceptible to corruption due to limited 
resources, desire to emigrate due to poorly performing economies, sick 
economies shifting the trend away from hemispheric integration, and indifferent 
economic support from the U.S. All of these issues could make security 
cooperation more difficult.15 
The neoliberal model has failed in Latin America and has aggravated 
social problems in almost every country. Poor economic performances and 
corruption in traditional governments were factors that did not allow satisfaction 
                                            
13  Paul D. Taylor, Latin America Security Challenges: A Collaborative Inquiry from North 
and South, ed. Peter Dombrowski, Vol. 21 (Rhode Island: Naval War College, 2004), 54. 
14  Ibid., 1. 
15  Ibid., 50-51. 
11 
of even the most basic needs of the population, stretching, even more, the gap 
between the rich and the poor. The latter was due to governments that managed 
their administrations with the best interests of specific groups of power in mind, 
the imposed policies of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and other factors 
that replaced corrupted governments. This situation led to the re-birth of socialist 
ideologies among Latin American governments and moved them away from the 
capitalist policies of the U.S. The following leaders all subscribed to theses 
socialist ideas. Fidel Castro in Cuba, Hugo Chavez in Venezuela, Evo Morales in 
Bolivia, Michelle Bachelet in Chile, Luiz Inacio Lula in Brazil, Nestor Kichner in 
Argentina, Tabare Vasquez in Uruguay, and Daniel Ortega in Nicaragua. 
  
B. TERRORISM 
Terrorism is notoriously difficult to define, in part because the term has 
evolved, and in part because it is associated with an activity that is designed to 
be subjective.  Several specialists and scholars have devoted great efforts to 
decide on a standard definition of terrorism and have come to the conclusion that 
those efforts are fruitless. Terrorism is intended to be a matter of perception and 
therefore is regarded differently by different observers.16 Terrorism has often 
been conceived in intractably broad ways; while the costs of terrorism and in the 
ways of combat, it tends to be constructed too narrowly. The general idea of 
terrorism is related to matters involving force against political authority in some 
way, but sometimes it is applied even more broadly to include just about any 
disliked action associated with someone else’s policy agenda.17  
In order to find a more accurate definition for contemporary terrorism, it is 
important to understand its evolution. According to Hoffman, terrorism was first 
popularized during the French revolution. Terrorism was adopted as a means of 
establishing order during the transient anarchical period of turmoil and upheaval 
that followed the uprising of 1789, which was associated with the ideals of virtue 
                                            
16  Cronin, Audrey K. and James M. Ludes, ed., Attacking Terrorism: Elements of a Grand 
Strategy (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2004), 3. 
17  Paul R. Pillar, Terrorism and U.S. Foreign Policy (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution 
Press, 2001), 12. 
12 
and democracy. The massive socio-economic changes engendered by the 
industrial revolution were creating new “universalist” ideologies (such as 
communism/Marxism), that were born of the alienation and exploitative 
conditions of capitalism. These conditions stimulated the emergence of a new 
era of terrorism, in which the concept gained many of the familiar revolutionary, 
anti-state connotations of today, and lasted until World War I.18  
By 1930, the meaning of terrorism changed again. It was now used less to 
refer to revolutionary changes against governments, and more to describe the 
practices of mass repression employed by totalitarian states and leaders against 
their own citizens. After World War II, terrorism gained back the revolutionary 
connotations with which it is more associated in Latin America and other 
developing regions. It was during this period that the “politically correct” 
appellation of “freedom fighters” appeared. During the 70s, terrorism continued to 
be viewed within a revolutionary context and was expanded to include nationalist 
and ethnic separatists groups. Even though the purpose of terrorism remained 
unchanged during the 80s, in recent years terrorism has been used to denote 
broader, less distinct phenomena. For example, it has come to be regarded as a 
calculated means to destabilize the West as part of a vast global conspiracy.19  
In the 1990s, the meaning of terrorism was indistinct from the emerging 
terms such as “narco-terrorism” and “gray-area” phenomena On one hand, 
Narco-terrorism was used for drug-trafficking, mainly in Latin America, and to 
advance the objectives of certain governments and terrorist organizations 
identified as Marxist-Leninist regimes. On the other hand, gray area phenomena 
highlighted the increasingly fluid and variable nature of sub-national conflicts in 
the post-Cold War era.   Thus the term “gray area phenomenon” was focused on 
threats to the stability of nation states by non-state actors and non-government 
organizations. 
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1. Proposed Definition 
It has been very difficult to fit one consistent definition to terrorism. Even 
though the UN tried to establish a definition, there were concerns from various 
countries. These countries pointed out that, from their perspective, the definition 
which the U.N was proposing defined what they called “freedom fighters.” 
Therefore, it is very important to understand the connotation of the term terrorism 
in a particular use or situation.  
There are several common elements in hundreds of “terrorism” definitions. 
The frequent use of these elements will help to form a definition which can be 
best used for the purpose of the present study. These elements may include, but 
are not limited to: violence, force, politics, fear, threat, psychological effects, 
innocent victims, planning, tactics, coercion, and publicity. Therefore, by using 
these frequent terms, the following definition is suggested: 
Terrorism is the unlawful and planned method of use of—or threatened 
use of—force and violence against innocent victims, exploiting of the information 
domain, designed to create fear among the population, and aim coerce the 
government in order to attain political objectives.  
 
2.  Terrorist Threats in Latin America 
Latin America has not received a direct attack organized through current 
international terrorism; therefore, terrorism is not the first priority in Latin America 
policy. While Latin America has not been the focal point in the GWOT, countries 
in the region have struggled with domestic terrorism for decades and 
international terrorist groups have, at times, used the region as a battleground to 
advance their causes. Even though the terrorism threat in Latin America seems 
to be low, terrorists may seek safe-havens, financing, recruiting, illegal travel, 
illegal documentation activities, or access to the U.S. from the area and pose a 
serious threat to the Western Hemisphere.20 U.S. has engaged in the GWOT and 
focused its attention towards the Middle East. Unfortunately, the terrorist threat 
has become transnational with the capability of reaching ungoverned areas in 
                                            
20  Sullivan, Latin America: Terrorism Issues, 1. 
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Latin America. Most of the anxiety in the U.S. is based on the presumption of the 
relative facility with which Islamic terrorists groups can establish themselves in 
cities and lawless areas in Latin America. There are large concentrations of 
Middle Eastern immigrants in Venezuela, Colombia, Paraguay, Chile, Peru, 
Honduras and Bolivia. The majority of these populations are Christian Arabs and 
Palestinians, but there are also Muslims among them.21 Although there is no 
evidence of financial support to al Qaeda, there is information about remittances 
from Middle Eastern immigrants to the HAMAS organization in Palestine and 
Hezbollah in Lebanon. 
Human smuggling is another way terrorists are attempting to take 
advantage of an illegal activity; the “American Dream” that is sought by many 
illegal immigrants. During 2004 and 2005, a number of individual Muslim and 
Middle Eastern illegal immigrants were captured in Central and South America 
traveling north. Some of the more unusual cases include: A Turkish citizen with a 
false Dutch passport who was arrested in Nicaragua on September 22, 2004; 
and Jordanians with false European passports who were arrested in Costa Rica. 
In early 2005, members of the fundamentalist Jamaat Tabligh Movement were in 
Argentina after attending a meeting in Chile.22  
Although terrorism is not the main focus of U.S. policy in regards to Latin 
America, there is an anti-terrorism assistance program (ATA) run by the 
Department of State. The problem is that there are not enough funds provided to 
improve the counterterrorism capabilities of any Latin American country except 
for Colombia. Colombia is the biggest recipient of U.S assistance funds. In 
FY2002, a total of $27.5 million was provided for Latin America, with $25 million 
for an anti-kidnapping program in Colombia and $2.5 million for the regular 
Western Hemisphere program. For FY2003 $3.6 million in ATA assistance was 
provided for the region, with $3.3 million of that for Colombia. For FY2004, $5.3                                             
21  Taylor, Latin America Security Challenges: A Collaborative Inquiry from North and South, 
7. 
22  Davidson II, Thomas S., "Terrorism and Human Smuggling Rings in South and Central 
America," Terrorism Monitor III, no. 22 (2005), 1-11. 
http://www.jamestown.org/terrorism/news/uploader/ter_003_022.pdf (accessed August 27, 2006), 
6. 
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million in ATA assistance was provided for the region. For FY2005, an estimated 
$11.1 million in ATA was provided for the region, with $3.9 million for Colombia 
and $0.5 million for the tri-border area of Argentina, Brazil and Paraguay Human 
smuggling is another way terrorists are attempting to take advantage of an illegal 
activity; the “American Dream” that is sought by many illegal immigrants.. The FY 
2006 ATA request for Latin America is $9.7 million, again with $3.9 for Colombia 
and $0.5 million for the tri-border area.23 This situation leaves the rest of Latin 
American countries with minimal funds to improve counterterrorism capabilities; 
therefore, “the Latin American perspective is that the main concerns of the U.S. 
regarding hemispheric security and the war on terrorism are related almost 
exclusively to the Colombian conflict situation.”24  
The U.S.-Latin American relationship is an unequal relationship. The 
current U.S. administration has introduced significant changes in National 
Security Strategy and in international relations that do not represent any positive 
change in U.S.-Latin American relations, but continue to neglect and show 
indifference to the region’s stability problems.25  
 
3.  Terrorist threats in Honduras 
Honduras is located in Central America. It is one of the poorest countries 
in Latin America and has a population of seven million people and a territory of 
112, 491 square kilometers. Honduras has access to the Atlantic and Pacific 
Oceans and manages five sea ports and four international airports as well. The 
country holds a very important strategic position that embraces several natural 
sea, air, and land traffic routes from North America to South America and vice 
versa. For example, it takes only two hours flying from Tegucigalpa (the capital) 
to Miami and/or Houston International Airports and only about one hour and a 
half to reach Panama. Part of the Pan-American Highway, that transits from 
Canada to Panama, runs through the southern part of Honduras.  
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Due to the country’s strategic location, Honduras could be a target for 
transnational terrorism. However, the main problems in Honduras have so far 
related to poverty, corruption, internal insecurity, and social inequality.   
 
 
Figure 1.    Map of Central America  
 
There are two types of terrorism that could threaten Honduras’ national 
security: domestic terrorism and transnational terrorism. Domestic terrorism is 
represented by existing revolutionary ideological groups that oppose the legally 
established government. Although these groups were declared officially inactive 
after the Cold War, they operate from the “underworld” using legal organizations 
as facades in order to harass the government and to create an unstable 
environment. On the other hand, transnational terrorism activities have not been 
confirmed, but existing conditions in Honduras could facilitate terrorist infiltration 
with the goal of targeting national and hemispheric related objectives; 
establishing safe-havens in ungoverned areas with the intention of financing, 
training, indoctrinating, and recruiting indigenous personnel; or projecting attacks 
across national borders. However, trying to deal with terrorist threats in a 
separate context [internal, external] is becoming very difficult due to globalization. 
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a.  Domestic Terrorism Threat 
In 1967, the Guatemalan government saw the first large-scale 
emergence of right-wing actions against revolutionary movement. This generated 
almost three decades of internal war. In 1979, the Sandinistan Front for National 
Liberation (FSLN) took over the government in Nicaragua after defeating the 
dictatorial government of Anastasio Somoza. After the Sandinista’s success in 
Nicaragua, the Salvadoran Frabundo Marti for Popular Liberation front started 
armed and political actions to attempt to overthrow the democratically elected 
government. This started a civil war that lasted almost two decades. All these 
conflicts had direct and indirect implications on the internal situation in Honduras. 
During the 1980s, left-wing insurgency groups in Honduras 
implemented armed and terrorist actions against the government in a series of 
political assassinations, kidnappings, bombings, hostages takings, hijackings and 
guerilla operations sponsored by Cuba through Nicaragua’s Sandinista 
Government and the Salvadoran FMLN. During this decade the U.S. provided 
foreign aid to Honduras in order to stabilize the tumultuous internal situation and 
attempt to limit revolutionary support for similar conflicts in neighboring countries.  
The insurgency groups identified in Honduras that conducted 
terrorist acts included:  
• The Popular Movement of Libereation Cinchonero (MPL-C), 
founded on September 7, 1979 after the Sandinistas took over the 
government in Nicaragua. This group operated as a clandestine-
independent organization whose leaders settled in Nicaragua. 
Thereafter, some of them were mobilized inside Honduras to 
conduct guerrilla operations.26  
• The Morazanist Front for National Liberation (FMLN), founded on 
September 16, 1979 at the Northern Regional University Center  
 
                                            
26 Mario Berrios, Los Comandantes (San Pedro Sula, Honduras: Editorial Olanchito, 2005), 
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(CURN) in San Pedro Sula. On the same day they were founded 
they detonated six “propaganda” bombs in different sites in the 
city.27  
• The Revolutionary Workers Party of Central America (PRTC).28  
• The Revolutionary Popular Force “Lorenzo Zelaya” initiated 
subversive urban operations on September 19, 1980 in 
Tegucigalpa. This organization had existed since 1975 under the 
name of Popular Of Unity Movement (MUP).29  
Honduras established the “National Security Policy” which 
strengthened the military apparatus and the government’s course of action to 
counter the insurgencies and terrorism emerging in the early 1980s. Some of the 
government actions and other situations that avoided a civil war in Honduras 
included:  agrarian reform, which allowed the distribution of a great amount of 
land to the peasantry; the restoration of democracy by allowing free elections in 
1979; the existence of two well-rooted political parties with more than two 
centuries of history; the government allowed workers to affiliate into unions; and 
the application of necessary early and selective repression. Although the 
insurgents conducted a series of operations to gain popular support, they were 
not able to acquire a mass following. 
Most of these insurgent groups returned to the underground 
organization and operations after the return to democracy in Nicaragua in 1990 
and the peace agreements in El Salvador in 1992 and Guatemala in 1996. 
Although these organizations are not currently active, they still posses the 
doctrine and organizational framework that would allow them to mobilize at any 
time; moreover, several of the organization’s leaders and members are politically 
active and have infiltrated several government organizations to date. It is also  
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argued that some operatives of these insurgent groups have fractionated into 
organized crime and other illicit activities with the intention of making easy 
money. 
 
b.  Transnational Terrorism Threat 
After the 9-11 attacks, Honduras condemned those terrorist actions 
and precipitately offered a commitment by signing regional and international 
agreements to agree combat transnational terrorism. Even though Honduras has 
not received a direct attack from transnational terrorism, it does not mean that it 
is not vulnerable. On June 2004, the Honduran Minister of Security announced 
that the Saudi Arabian Adnan Gulshar al Shrrikjumah, a suspected al Qaeda 
militant, was spotted in an internet café in Tegucigalpa. According to the 
minister’s declarations, “these terrorists have been entering the country in order 
to find out the way to infiltrate into the U.S. and in Central America with the aim to 
strike North Americans and their allies.” He also stated, “We have the hypothesis 
that terrorists have recruited persons in our country in order to set off explosives 
in Central America or the U.S.”30  
Besides the knowledge of terrorists transiting through Honduras, 
there are several conditions that could encourage terrorists to conduct operations 
and select targets inside the country. Among those conditions are: 
• The fact that Honduras is signatory to international agreements to 
combat terrorism, would position Honduras as a potential terrorist 
target. 
• Honduras sent troops to participate in the International Coalition 
Force for the Iraq War; therefore, the fact that Honduras supported 
the coalition makes the country a potential threat to transnational 
terrorism. 
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• Honduras possesses several poorly governed areas, which could 
be used by terrorists as safe-havens. One of the areas is La 
Mosquitia, an isolated region of eastern Honduras that can be 
accessed only by plane or boat. Two other areas are Colon and 
Olancho, where the poor communication infrastructure, 
overextended areas, and difficult terrain make it difficult for the 
government to exercise control. 
• After the Cold War, Honduras was forced to downsize its military 
apparatus and, consequently, has neglected control of sea and 
land borders. Honduras has three international land borders and 
eight maritime borders. Moreover, according to the Latin American 
Security and Defense Network, Honduras is one of the Latin 
American countries with the least investment in national defense;31 
therefore, the country is almost unprotected and is vulnerable to 
any internal or external threat. 
• There is not an efficient air and sea port security. 
• Law enforcement and the legal system are inefficient32 and 
corrupt. It is argued that these systems are permeable to the 
influence of organized crime and drug trafficking. The huge profits 
involved in these activities have lead to corruption in law 
enforcement and legal systems, and even politicians have been 
affected by the political power of drug traffickers. 
• The country’s legislation is not clear concerning perpetrators of 
terrorism. 
• There are several U.S. capital investment enterprises in the 
country.  More than 150 American companies operate in Honduras 
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and U.S. franchises which are present in increasing numbers 
which could represent potential targets for terrorists. 
• The U.S. military presence through Joint Task Force Bravo in 
Comayagua might be seen by terrorists as a strong military 
relationship between the U.S. and Honduras. 
•  Two major airlines working in Honduras are from the U.S.’ 
American and Continental Airlines. 
• There is not an efficient infrastructure to provide control over 
financial transactions. 
• The current military counterterrorism capability is almost null. 
• There is not a governmental structure in place which can directly 
handle a terrorism crisis. 
• The economy is still plagued by over-regulation and still dominated 
to a significant degree by Arab-Lebanese and Jewish family 
monopolies which reduce opportunities for the creation of new 
business.33  
• The potential nexus between terrorism and organized crime are 
conditions that would put security issues at risk in Honduras. 
The current “left turn” tendency in Latin America seems to offer 
more options than the economic, social and political reforms implemented in 
Honduras in the mid-1980s. Those reforms made promises they did not deliver 
on. Socialist regimes are taking over countries in South America34 and promising 
what neoliberal models were not capable of providing. The U.S. is not paying 
close attention to what is going on in the region. If Honduras’ national interests 
are not congruent with those of the U.S., the Honduran government would tend 
to look for different options other than the U.S. support. This would leave empty 
spaces so that groups with different ideologies and even terrorists could take the 
opportunity to increase the population’s dislike to the current U.S. policy. A 
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product of the latter is the Honduran President’s declaration on September 14, 
2006 that “the future is in South America.” The President Manuel Zelaya stated 
that the economic and social future for Honduras and Central America relies on 
sharing experiences and making alliances with their southern neighbors; 
moreover, that the economic models and parts of the political systems of various 
South American nations should be the patterns to follow. 35 Due to the 
complexity of this subject it will not be addressed in depth in this thesis and the 
subject will left open for further analysis. 
The current situation in Honduras, besides the previously 
expressed conditions, reveals vulnerabilities that terrorists or groups with 
different ideologies could take advantage of. Moreover, these vulnerabilities and 
the current trend of Latin American population to dislike the foreign policies the 
U.S. has toward the region could threaten security in the Western Hemisphere.   
 
 
C. DRUG TRAFFICKING 
The international drug trade is considered by many to be one of the great 
global challenges of modern times. Drug use remains steady or increasing in 
both the developed and developing worlds. Drug production, at least partly in 
response to this increasing demand, is similarly on the increase—again, in both 
developing and developed worlds. However, the international aspect of drug 
markets goes further than the geographical disparity between production and 
consumption. The proceeds from trafficking are often laundered on a global 
scale, utilizing international financial markets. Corruption associated with the 
drug trade affects national governments and, in turn, permeates into the 
international relationships between governments.36  
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1. Drug Trafficking in Latin America 
The most demanding country for drugs in the Western Hemisphere is the 
U.S. “Almost 80% of the cocaine and 90% of the marijuana entering the U.S. 
come from Latin America. Produced in the Andes region (Bolivia, Peru and 
Colombia), the drugs transit via the West Indies, Central America and Mexico 
(fig. 2), which are the trafficking centers of the international mafia allied with the 
Colombian drug cartels that establish the law in the region.”37 According to the 
UN, Plan Colombia38 produced a modest displacement of coca to other 
countries. By 2003, cultivation was up slightly in Bolivia but stable in Peru. 
Overall, the UN calculated that the total potential output of Andean cocaine was 
655 tons in 2003.39 
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Figure 2.   Drug Trafficking Routes40  
 
2.  Drug Trafficking in Honduras  
Honduras is a transit country for South American cocaine destined for the 
United States. In fact, the majority of all drugs entering Honduras are destined for 
the United States. The remaining amount is consumed domestically or 
transported to other Central American and Caribbean countries. Maritime    
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vessels and land vehicles are the primary conveyances used in cocaine 
movement into, and through, Honduras. Noncommercial aircraft also are used to 
smuggle cocaine, as demonstrated by a seizure of 630 kilograms of cocaine 
brought into the country by plane. Honduran authorities believe that the volume 
of illegal drugs transiting the country has risen, as the local consumption of 
cocaine and crack is escalating.41  
 
D. GANGS (MARAS) 
During the late 1980’s, the Sandinistas were consolidating the 
revolution in Nicaragua, the FMLN were on the brink of 
overthrowing the government in El Salvador and the radical 
movements in Guatemala and Honduras were gaining ground. 
Today it is a region convulsed by massive delinquency and state 
corruption whose economies are surviving tenuously on remittance 
money sent by migrants.42  
Some of the factors that contribute to the increase of gang activities in Central 
America, Mexico, and the U.S. are: income inequality, poverty; highly urbanized 
populations, unemployment, and family disintegration in their home countries.  
The major gangs operating in Central America with ties to the United 
States are the “18th Street” gang (also known as M-18), and their main rival, the 
Mara Salvatrucha (MS-13). The 18th Street gang was formed by Mexican 
immigrants in the Rampart section of Los Angeles in the 1960s by youths who 
were not accepted into existing Hispanic gangs. MS-13 was created during the 
1980s by Salvadorans in Los Angeles who fled their country’s civil conflict. It now 
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Mexico and Central America. The MS-13 gang has expanded geographically, 
and may pose an increasing regional security threat as it becomes more 
organized and sophisticated.43 
 
1. Gangs in Latin America 
Although many Latin American countries are facing serious crime 
problems associated with gangs (maras), the largest and most violent gangs in 
the region operate in Central America and Mexico. These gangs could pose a 
serious threat to the region’s stability. Honduras, Guatemala, and El Salvador are 
at the epicenter of the gang crisis, with some of the highest murder rates in the 
world. In 2004, the estimated murder rate per 100,000 people was 45.9 in 
Honduras, 41.2 in El Salvador, and 34.7 in Guatemala. In the U.S., the 
corresponding figure was 5.7. Salvadoran police estimate that at least 60% of the 
2,576 murders committed there in 2004 were gang-related. Estimates of the 
number of gang members in Central America vary widely, but the U.S. Southern 
Command has placed that figure at around 70,000. The gangs are reportedly 
involved in human trafficking; drug, automobile, and weapons smuggling; and 
kidnapping. In the last two years, nearly 1,100 gang members have been 
arrested in Mexico. Many of those arrested were charging migrant smugglers to 
let their groups pass or working with Mexican drug cartels. Regional and U.S. 
authorities have confirmed gang involvement in regional drug trafficking. The 
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) has found no credible evidence of a 
connection between Central American gangs and al-Qaeda or other terrorist 
groups.44 However, U.S. efforts to contain terrorism in the Middle East and the 
lack of attention to Latin America in general may attract terrorists to displace and 
occupy ungoverned areas in this region and pose an even greater threat to the 
Western Hemisphere. 
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2. Gangs in Honduras 
The gangs (maras) are currently the worst public safety concern in 
Honduras. The main gangs, Mara Salvatrucha and Mara 18, originated in 
California in the 1980s after nearly one million Salvadorans fled to the United 
States during El Salvador's civil war and settled in impoverished neighborhoods 
in Los Angeles where gang violence was rife. As the Central American region 
began to recover from an almost 12-year insurgency conflict that ended with a 
peace accord in 1992, U.S. authorities began to deport thousands of gang 
members to Central America where the explosion of gang violence during the 
late 1990s lifted homicide rates above those seen during the armed conflict. The 
gangs spread to Honduras, Guatemala, and Nicaragua, and more recently to 
Mexico.45  
During the first six months of 2005, the Honduran authorities tallied more 
than 1,400 homicides—all in a country of seven million people. Many of these 
homicides were gang-related. The U.S. estimates that between 15,000 and 
25,000 Mara Salvatrucha and Mara 18 members are in the country and pose a 
serious threat, because members use violence to protect drug and weapons 
trafficking operations from rival gangs, according to a 2004 intelligence report. If 
these rates remain steady or increase, it is possible that the stability of the 
democracies might fail, and it would then be next to impossible to implement 
social development policies46  
In 2002, the Honduran government established the “mano dura’ (strong 
hand) policy against “maras.” The policy has focused mainly on those people 
suspected of having ties with youth gangs. Reports stated that 204 members of 
gangs were arrested in Honduras in 2005, and 321 members of gangs were 
arrested in Honduras in the first quarter of this year alone. These arrests were 
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made under a special law that allows people to be arrested merely on suspicion 
of belonging to gangs (under the charge of “illicit association”) even if they are 
not suspected of committing a crime. But this "tough on crime" stance has drawn 
warnings from human rights groups, which point to the risk that the draconian 
legislation could lead to an increase in human rights abuses and police 
brutality.47 During the Central American Integration System's 26th regular 
meeting in the Honduran capital in late June, a commitment to create a “rapid 
response” force to tackle the problem of youth gangs was signed by the region’s 
leaders and the presidents of Mexico and the United States. 
Gang activity has now escalated to the level of domestic terrorism. On 
December 23, 2004, Mara Salvatrucha members ambushed a public 
transportation bus in Northern Honduras (fig. 3). The gangs fired AK-47s at 
innocent civilians who were traveling for Christmas shopping. “Twenty-eight” 
were shot dead; sixteen men, six women and six children. The gangs left a 
written message on the bus stating that they were against the government’s 
policies on handling crime and gangs. The [mara] were directly threatening the 
Honduran President, the president of the congress, and the minister of security 
because of their policies.  
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Figure 3.   Mara Salvatrucha Ambush on December 23, 2004 
 
E.  ORGANIZED CRIME 
Organized crime has its roots deep in the economic and cultural 
framework of Latin America. Organized crime has evolved from its simplest form 
of brawling, by larcenous and predatory stick-up gangs of nineteenth century to a 
more complex criminal organization. Even though criminal activity has evolved, 
the objective remains the same: getting easy money.48 In a few cases, links do 
exist between transnational criminal enterprises and terrorist organizations, 
although those links do not amount to a systematic organized crime-terrorism 
nexus. In some instances, organized crime uses terror tactics; more often, 
terrorist organizations use organized crime activities to fund their political and 
military campaigns. Each type of group, in effect, appropriates the strategies and 
tactics of the other when necessary or expedient. Yet this does not necessarily 
mean that there is a convergence of organized crime and terrorism. Throughout 
Latin America, the distinctions between organized crime—which is essentially 
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profit driven—and terrorism—which is about the pursuit of political change 
through the use of violence—have remained clear and distinct.49 However, there 
is a “gray area” where terrorism and organized crime could converge. The gray 
area includes illegal activities where neither terrorists nor criminals take credit, 
but the blend of both activities may prove advantageous for each organization in 
reaching its goals.  
 
1. Organized Crime in Latin America 
Organized crime has grown in Latin America as in other parts of the world. 
Although organized crime is a great threat to Latin America, governments have 
overlooked this situation, or even worse, they [governments] have already been 
penetrated by this flagellum. All kinds of illicit activities have grown to frightening 
proportions since the end of the Cold War including prostitution, trafficking in 
migrants, arms smuggling, money laundering, vehicle smuggling, and 
kidnappings.  
When the Cold War was over, Latin America focused on strengthening 
economic progress and improving democratic governance. New economic 
models were introduced and “globalization has blurred the economic distinctions 
between countries creating a borderless world.”50  These economic reforms have 
perhaps improved the macroeconomic situations of the Latin American countries, 
but the reforms have worsened microeconomics in Latin America as well. The 
poor microeconomic performance throughout Latin America has created a high 
rate of unemployment; moreover, unemployment has induced the population to 
emigrate from their home countries with the intention of looking for better job 
opportunities. On the other hand, many who stay in their own countries and do 
not find jobs or are looking for an easy way to make money, engage in illicit 
activities to satisfy their demands. Globalization has introduced new elements 
characterized by the opening of borders, the elimination of currency regulations, 
                                            
49 Laura Graces, Colombia: The Link Between Drugs and Terror, Vol. 35 Journal of Drug 
Issues, 2005), 83. 
50 Patrick O'Meara, Howard D. Mehlinger and Matthew Krain, eds., Globalization and the 
Challenges of a New Century (Indiana: Indiana University Press, 2000), 101. 
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and the rise of the internet. Although these factors have facilitated economic 
trade, they also have weakened security issues and have given organized crime 
more opportunities to operate. With globalization, communications are more 
direct and discreet and provide organized crime with the capability of performing 
anonymous transactions and allow for the placement of criminal networks.  
 
2. Organized Crime in Honduras 
Organized crime has grown in Honduras at an alarming rate. The majority 
of organized crime activities in Honduras include trafficking in migrants, arms 
smuggling, money laundering, automobile smuggling, and kidnapping performed 
both by transnational criminal networks and domestic criminal organizations. 
These illegal activities are inter-related and sometimes connected to drug 
trafficking. One hypothesis regarding organized crime in Honduras is that 
revolutionary conflicts are not an internal issue anymore; therefore, insurgents 
have evolved their actions into organized crime. In early 1990s, once these 
insurgent groups were disbanded, although their leadership kept working 
underground or actually in government organizations, their operatives 
fractionalized into small cells with individual interests. Additionally, there is the 
knowledge that the “maras” also provide operatives to organized crime groups. 
The organized crime leaders then exploit the “maras’” drug trafficking, arm 
smuggling, and clandestine assassination channels to perpetrate their illicit 
activities while allowing leaders of organized crime to remain covert. Moreover, 
the transition from homemade guns to a more sophisticated arsenal, including 
AK-47s, and the improvement of communications is a reference point by which to 
address the relationship between the gangs and organized crime. The gangs are 
known for exchanging drugs for arms and for operating a cell-phone robbery 
network which provides their means of communication.   
In Honduras, trafficking in migrants has been detected and the incidents 
have risen. Since 2001, several migration officers have been arrested due to 
trafficking in migrants or document falsification. The main ethnic groups involved 
in this illegal activity include Colombians, Chinese, Lebanese, and Cubans. For 
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example, Chinese mob have been identified trying to move illegal Chinese into 
Honduras through connections in Cuba and the Caribbean. This is at a cost of 
$20,000 per individual and is paid to corrupt government officials who have 
connections to organized crime. Once these illegal immigrants get temporary or 
permanent resident status, they [illegal immigrants] wait for some time and then 
move to the U.S. 
The kidnapping industry has been one of the more notorious in Honduras, 
and often does not correspond to political demands, but is often for ransom. 
Around 25 to 35 kidnappings take place every year in Honduras, mostly in major 
cities like Tegucigalpa and San Pedro Sula. The police have not been able to 
resolve these criminal actions; therefore, in most cases, the family members 
have to negotiate ransoms with kidnappers to release their relatives. This 
situation and the inefficiency of law enforcement has turned kidnapping into a 
highly profitable criminal industry. Moreover, there had been cases where corrupt 
police members have been in league with this criminal activity. 
Automobile stealing has increased in Honduras by about 52% since 2004. 
This means that in 2006 around fifty vehicles are lost every month and 
represents a loss of $450,000 a month. Only 10% of these stolen cars are ever 
recovered51 This situation is part of the automobile smuggling network operating 
in Central America that moves stolen vehicles mainly between Honduras, 
Guatemala, and El Salvador. It is known that car smugglers are now employing 
“maras” to perform this illegal activity, showing the connection among “gangs” 
and all kinds of activities of organized crime. 
In the past four years there have been nearly 200 reported cases of 
money laundering in Honduras. This illicit activity has been identified by 
monetary deposits, real estate investments, and facade businesses that people 
or business companies are conducting without proving records of a reliable credit 
history. Most money laundering activities come from drug trafficking, but they 
                                            
51El Heraldo, "Aumenta Robo De Autos," sec. Economia, March 16, 2006. 
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also include a small percentage from kidnapping and vehicle smuggling. There is 
a suspicion that corrupt government officials are involved in this activity. For 
example, it is currently known that the Supreme Court is managing at least 
twelve money laundering cases, but slowness in the judicial process 
demonstrates suspicious involvement of judges, or at least, shows possible 
common interests between judges and perpetrators. 
 
F. CONCLUSION 
Globalization has increased international economic trade, but it also has 
opened borders and facilitated conditions for non-traditional emerging threats. 
Terrorism, drug trafficking, gangs, and organized crime are illicit activities with a 
transnational connotation currently affecting Latin America. Honduras is trying to 
maintain an internally stable situation. However, drug trafficking, gangs and 
organized crime seems to be controlling the environment. The lack of resources, 
poor economic conditions, and corruption at different levels is leading this 
country to be a potential candidate for the list of failed-states. The Latin American 
trend to the “left” might be a vision and opportunity that the current Honduran 
government is looking at in order to experiment with new “economic” models with 
the intention of fulfilling the population’s needs and wants. 
Although terrorism is not currently a priority for Honduras, the 
transnational trend of terrorist organizations, the importance of Honduras geo-
strategic location, and the weakness of the country’s security infrastructure might 
be seen by terrorists as an opportunity to establish safe-havens and initiate 
actions with the intention of harming the Western Hemisphere. Therefore, it 
would be preferable to think ahead and formulate a specific national strategy to 
combat eventual terrorist actions rather than jump abruptly into a situation of 
crisis management that would reveal to the international community the 























THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK
35 
III.  NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY 
Chapter II addresses, in a generic form, the emerging threats of the 
twentieth century in Latin America; moreover, it provides an overall picture of the 
influence of those threats, in a Honduran context. The present chapter provides 
an overview of the national security strategy, and a strategic intent for Honduras 
to combat terrorism. Furthermore, this chapter suggests the formulation of a 
Honduran National Security Strategy to Combat Terrorism. This strategy 
establishes the objectives (ends), strategic concepts (ways), and resources 
(means) to manage any terrorist threat.  
 
A. OVERVIEW 
Even though terrorism is not the first priority in Honduras’ national 
objectives, it is of primary importance for the country’s government to formulate a 
national strategy that would avoid the Honduran government jumping abruptly 
into a terrorism crisis-management situation.52 Moreover, the international 
agreements and commitments to which Honduras is signatory require an internal 
stratagem capable of integrating national efforts into the regional and 
hemispheric strategies to combat terrorism.  
The key element in formulating a strategy to combat terrorism is the 
development of “political vision and political will to carry out the fight.”53 
Therefore, it is fundamental that the Honduran government officials understand 
the importance of their role in such a strategy and the importance that they must 
place on the threats of internal and transnational terrorism to the country’s 
national interests. Because combating terrorism is not the priority for Honduras, 
governmental officials have neglected the importance of formulating a specific 
strategy to deal with terrorism; moreover, the Honduran officials have only 
employed diplomatic efforts. In this way they are demonstrating a subjective 
                                            
52 Crisis management occurs when there is no strategy or the strategy fails. 
53 Alex P. Shmid and Ronald D. Crelisten, eds., Western Response to Terrorism (London: 
Frank Cass Publisher, 1993), 257. 
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governmental position to deal with the “real” threat of terrorism, namely domestic 
or transnational. Since a strategy process is an intensely human activity 
concentrated in the upper level of governments, leadership plays a crucial role.54  
Although Central America is pursuing a regional effort to support the 
GWOT, Honduras needs to formulate a national strategy with the intention to 
integrate domestic resources into the overall context. In order to integrate these 
efforts, the Central American countries need first to eliminate several 
“showstoppers” that make this regional intention unrealistic. These showstoppers 
include, but are not limited to, territorial disputes,55 the lack of willingness of the 
governments to see terrorism as a clear and present danger, the military 
governments’ syndrome,56 unbalanced and poor economies, differences in the 
countries’ legislations, and the military power balance within the region. 
The formulation of the strategy in this thesis may not perfectly align with 
the regional and/or hemispheric vision to combat terrorism; however, it does 
provide basic elements that would facilitate the integration of these strategies 
and encourage further study on the integration topic. Although this thesis 
identified several emerging threats in Latin America, including Honduras, it 
focused on the specific objective of combating terrorism. It is also important to 
understand that a strategy is fundamentally a choice; it reflects a preference for a 
future state or condition.57 Therefore, the present strategy is a flexible model that 
can be refined to fulfill a specific goal in combating terrorism; moreover, this 
strategy could be adapted to reach different objectives against threats related to 
                                            
54 Grattan, The Strategy Process, 155. 
55 Honduras maintains territorial disputes with Nicaragua and El Salvador. Nicaragua 
disputes the boundaries of Honduran national waters in the Atlantic Ocean and the Nicaraguans 
and Salvadorans present an argument over maritime borders in the Fonseca Gulf in the Pacific. 
According to their argument, Honduras is limited in the continental sea to internal waters in the 
gulf only , which constraints  Honduras’ overseas reach and the exploitation of  resources in open 
waters. El Salvador lays claim to land areas along the international border as well as claiming 
possession of Isla Conejo (Honduran island). Isla Conejo is strategically located in the Fonseca 
Gulf and allows the projection of the Honduran maritime border further out of the gulf.  
56 Military governments ruled Central America for more than three decades; therefore, 
politicians see the military as a threat to the democratic system instead of an instrument of 
national power.  
57 Yarger, Towards a Theory of Strategy: Art Lykke and the Army War College Strategy 
Model, 2. 
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terrorism. Some of these threats are drug trafficking, gang activities, organized 
crime, or the amalgamation of all of them. “National Security Strategy lays out 
broad objectives and direction for the use of all the instruments of power. From 
this National Security Strategy the major activities and departments develop 
subordinates strategies.”58  
 
1. Strategy Definitions 
Richard Yarger points out that strategy is the employment of the 
instruments of national power to achieve the political objectives of the state in 
cooperation with, or in competition with, other actors pursuing their own 
objectives. The U.S. Army War College defines national security strategy as the 
art and science of developing, applying, and coordinating the instruments of 
national power to achieve objectives that contribute to national security. Yarger 
also argues that strategy provides direction for the coercive and persuasive use 
of national power to achieve specified objectives; thus strategy is proactive and 
anticipatory.59  
Strategy formulation is a process that is to end in outcomes. The decision 
provides ways of achieving the objectives or aims established for the 
organization within the means available. The process and the decision are 
influenced by the nature of the decision maker and the context in which the 
decision is made.60 Therefore, it is important that the political leadership 
understand their role in such a strategy, and that their responsibility to then fulfill 
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59 Ibid.,1-3 
60 Grattan, The Strategy Process, 155. 
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2. Approaches Against Terrorism 
According to Steven and Gunaratna, there are two different approaches to 
combat terrorism: the criminal justice model (CJM), and the war model (WM). 
The CJM prioritizes the preservation of democratic principles, even at the 
expense of reduced effectiveness of counterterrorist measures. The WM places 
a stronger emphasis on restraining or countering terrorism rather than upholding 
liberal democratic rights.61  
“During the second half of the 1980s, terrorism came to be defined by the 
U.S. as a crime, and terrorist criminals to be persecuted.”62 Even now, when 
President Bush has declared a war on terrorism, “Patterns of Global Terrorism,” 
a report issued by the State Department, says that terrorists must be brought to 
justice for their crimes.63 This is a contradiction that has created discrepancies 
among approaches for dealing with transnational terrorism. These discrepancies, 
augmented by the nature of contemporary terrorism, generate a “gray area” 
where it is not clear if terrorism should be treated as crime or as war.  
“The debate over whether terrorism is a crime or an act of war is an old 
argument that is fundamentally artificial: Terrorism is both, of course, and the 
response must include law enforcement and military means, depending on the 
situation.”64 In Honduras, which has a different policy from other countries, there 
is limitation as to the use of employing the military in internal security issues, but 
not a restriction against employing the military in internal security issues as there 
is in the U.S.(as set forth in the Posse Comitatus Act). However, the Honduran 
constitution states, in article No. 274, that “the military will cooperate with law 
enforcement organizations, by request of the Ministry of Security, to combat 
terrorism, arms smuggling and organized crime.”65 The problem is that although 
                                            
61 Steven and Gunaratna, Counterterrorism, 100-101. 
62 Howard and Sawyer, Terrorism and Counterterrorism: Understanding the New Security 
Environment, 521. 
63 Ibid. 
64 Audrey K. Cronin. and James M. Ludes, Attacking Terrorism: Elements of a Grand 
Strategy, 8. 
65 Constitución de La Republica De Honduras, Public Law 131, (2005): 19, 132. 
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the constitution was amended in 1995, it does not actually address what 
organizations will be directly responsible for combating terrorism; therefore, it is 
necessary to create new legislative amendments in order to delegate and 
coordinate such responsibilities. 
Due to its legislation and the current situation, Honduras could adopt a 
hybrid approach for combating terrorism. This hybrid approach might be a blend 
of the criminal justice model and the war model that could integrate national 
resources, thereby “encouraging organizations to cooperate with each other in 
pursuit of a common goal.”66 “The need for flexibility and the ability to use and 
combine all measures to suit specific cases are paramount in countering 
terrorism effectively.”67  
    
3. Strategic Intent 
The intent of the Honduran National Strategy must be to neutralize any 
attempt at a terrorist attack or terrorism threat to national interests, the 
government, the population, any infrastructure or means of transportation that 
could cause large numbers of civilian casualties. It must also be to deny the 
utilization of national territory to conduct and/or project acts of terrorism attacks, 
through defensive (antiterrorism) and offensive (counterterrorism) actions and to 
prevent, deter and respond to terrorism in order to maintain a stable environment 
and to secure the desired national objectives. 
 
B. STRATEGY FORMULATION 
1. Goal: Prevent Terrorist Actions 
In order to prevent terrorist actions, Honduras has to integrate national 
resources in order to apply coordinated defensive measures with the intention of 
defending the sovereignty, territory, population, and national interests from 
terrorist threats. 
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67 Steven and Gunaratna, Counterterrorism, 101. 
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a. Objective: Organize the Counterterrorism Infrastructure 
The organization of a Counterterrorism infrastructure (Appendix A) 
makes necessary the assignment of authority and responsibility for every person 
involved, from the political authority down to the executors. 
The strategic concept requires the government to reactivate the 
National Defense and Security Council (NSC) and to create a National 
Counterterrorism Group (NCTG)68 under the NSC. The NCTG would integrate 
and exercise control over necessary national counterterrorism resources. It 
would also integrate, in its organization, appropriate staff personnel and 
supportive teams capable of managing any act of terrorism. This 
counterterrorism organization would establish levels of authority, a structure, and 
a chain of command, with lines of communication as short and direct as possible, 
in order to reduce bureaucracy and expedite the “decision making” process. This 
strategic concept would create government controlled conditions that could 
prevent, deter, and respond to any terrorism threat. 
The resources required for this organization include the National 
Security Council which would be the top “decision making” organization; the 
National Counterterrorism Group, which would be responsible for managing crisis 
situations; the Strategic National Intelligence Bureau (SNIB),69 which would be 
responsible for integrating, evaluating, and disseminating intelligence input from 
the different intelligence agencies; the Honduran Armed Forces, which would be 
in a leading role and would provide the Counterterrorism Tactical Assault Unit70 
and all sea, air and land assets required to combat terrorism; the Honduran 
National Police, which would be in a supporting role and would provide first 
responder assets; and the Fire Department, which would be responsible for 
managing first-aid and fire control systems. Every organization within the 
                                            
68 The NCTG may include permanent staff members, crisis management, evacuation, risk 
analysis, public affairs, and public safety teams. 
69 The SNBI is actually in the foundation process. 
70 The CTAU exists as part of the Special Forces Battalion, but needs to be reorganized and 
reequipped. The armament and equipment ages from the 1980’s; therefore, most of it is obsolete; 
moreover, the unit lacks transportation and communication systems. These are areas where 
foreign military aid would be very beneficial. 
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counterterrorism infrastructure would be responsible for formulating its own 
strategies and organizing their individual resources as part of the overall 
Honduran national security systems to combat terrorism. 
 
b.  Objective: Structure Pre-Incident Plans 
Pre-incident planning involves preparing for an occurrence that the 
government hopes will never come to pass. However, efforts involving 
information gathering, risk analysis, organization, training, information operations, 
determining logistical needs, and purchasing necessary supplies and equipment 
must be implemented.71  
The strategic concept requires that pre-incident planning would be 
a joint effort as part of a counterterrorism policy with the intention of integrating 
necessary resources, coordinating specific operations, and delineating authority 
and responsibilities for the organization in order to anticipate any terrorist 
incident. Pre-incident plans would include “what if” situations and would be 
reviewed periodically and updated as necessary.72 Furthermore, the pre-incident 
stage should be based on “capability-base planning” where more flexible, 
adaptive, and robust capabilities are offered to engage a wider range of 
challenges that depict the emerging threats in Honduras.73  
Diplomats might not be the leaders in the pre-planning process, but 
they could be required to develop the international consensus to integrate 
regional and hemispheric strategies, due to the fact that transnational terrorism is 
a political matter. Intelligence and the military forces would be the supported 
instruments providing detailed information gathering and planning expertise to 
the NCTG. The National Police and Fire Department would provide their 
respective input and expertise for pre-incident planning. The Ministry of the  
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Treasury would present an adequate budget to finance the strategy and would 
coordinate with other instruments of national power to overcome shortages 
through foreign aid if necessary. 
 
c. Objective: Share Intelligence and Apply Information 
Controls 
The role of intelligence agencies is paramount in the fight against 
terrorism. Intelligence might be considered the “first line of defense” against 
terrorism, as well for other important policy instruments of national power. On the 
other hand, the relationship and importance of the media to terrorism and 
counterterrorism is another factor, (of the informational instrument of power) to 
have in mind in the prevention of terrorism. The media and public opinion are 
central elements in the terrorist organization’s attack policy.74 Terrorists can use 
the media to convey propaganda, mobilize support, and disrupt counterterrorism 
responses. The media are supposed to be neutral, but can change or influence a 
situation.75  
The strategic concept requires that intelligence should be gathered 
and shared among leading agencies combating terrorism, but it also should be 
centrally directed and coordinated by the government (Appendix B). “Whatever 
the resources, and however the data are collected, intelligence must include at 
least potential targets, target profiles and terrorists.”76 Although intelligence is 
critical for pre-incident planning, it should be updated throughout all other stages. 
Due to the variety of emerging threats in Honduras, it is suggested that for 
improving efficiency, specific information requirements should be established for 
every agency. Therefore, as general guidance, military intelligence requirements 
should be focused on terrorism and drug trafficking threats. Due to the nature of 
potential external influences, this would let the police intelligence focus on gangs 
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and domestic crime and the General Criminal Investigation Directorate (DGIC) 
focus on organized crime. The military and international police (INTERPOL) 
should be the connecting agencies for sharing intelligence between SNIB and 
international intelligence agencies.  
The informational instrument would employ strategic psychological 
operations with the intention of enhancing the image of the legitimate 
government by institutionalizing the process of public diplomacy, in order to 
demonstrate the national counterterrorism policy with the aim to integrating the 
national policy with regional and hemispheric efforts against terrorism. The 
NCTG’s public affairs team also would be responsible for controlling the media, 
because accuracy is often sacrificed in the media environment by speed or 
emotional impact. This implies that the media runs on financial impetus but not 
on moral principles. Although the media can benefit the terrorists, it can also 
benefit the government; therefore, the government should take advantage of the 
media through informational campaigns covering terrorist acts and atrocities to 
harden public resolve against terrorism. The media should exercise voluntary 
self-restraint, try to avoid live coverage, use experts on terrorism, obey the crisis 
authorities, and work closely with security forces; moreover, journalists also need 
training in how to responsibly cover the terrorist crisis.77  
The government would provide the national information policy and 
would integrate all information operations from the other instruments of power. 
The SNIB should be the agency leading the intelligence instrument and would 
centralize all intelligence flows from domestic and international intelligence 
agencies (Appendix B). The NCTG should have a public affairs team in charge of 
issuing media coverage policies and training journalists in how to deal with 
terrorist incidents. Military forces should handle intelligence regarding terrorism; 
however, all other intelligence agencies should cooperate in merging information 
that could contribute to the prevention of terrorism acts.  
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d. Objective: Conduct Risk Assessment 
Risk can be described in terms of its potential for occurrence and 
its capacity for loss. Risk assessment should attempt to evaluate the possibility of 
a terrorism incident and assign a degree of risk to it. Moreover, risk assessment 
would survey to ascertain how high the probability is of one of these risks 
occurring, how well the government can respond, and how well the government 
can carry out its response once the terrorism incident materializes. Once the risk 
is identified, the objective is to neutralize or eliminate the hazards creating that 
risk.78  
The strategic concept requires that all instruments of power 
involved in counterterrorism conduct a risk analysis to identify and assess factors 
that may jeopardize the success of achieving the prevention of terrorist actions. 
Every governmental organization’s risk assessment team analysis should 
include: an asset definition, which would establish the boundaries of what is to be 
reviewed; threat identification, which would identify any circumstance or event 
with the potential to cause harm to the asset under review; determination of the 
probability of occurrence (Appendix C), which would procure an overall indication 
of how probable it is that a potential threat might be exercised against the risk 
assessment asset under review; a determination of the impact of the threat (Fig. 
4), which would identify the risk level that could be assigned to each threat, 
resulting in a decision of the appropriate action to be taken; a recommendation of 
controls that would possibly eliminate the risk or at least reduce the risk to an 
acceptable level; and the submittal of the proper documentation, which, once the 
risk assessment is complete, would help decision makers to decide on policy, 
procedures, budget, and system and management changes for neutralizing 
terrorism threats.79  
The NCTG’s risk analysis team would be the centralized 
organization where risk assessments from subordinates (intelligence, police, 
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armed forces, fire department) and external organizations (ministries of foreign 
affairs, internal affairs, and treasury) would be reevaluated.  


































 High – Corrective actions must be implemented 
 Medium – Corrective actions should be implemented 
 Low – No actions required at this time 
 
Table 1.   Probability-Impact Matrix80  
 
e.  Objective: Implement Target Hardening Programs 
The physical security program must be an essential element in 
antiterrorism models. The main limitation is the cost of defensive measures and 
the restriction of movement;81 therefore, a basic approach is to start the “target 
hardening” program based on a crime prevention plan and build it up to reach 
counterterrorism standards through constant evaluations and identification of 
high-risk facilities or areas82. The purpose of “target hardening” programs is to 
make it more difficult for terrorist intelligence cells to gain access to areas from 
which they could collect information or even from getting access those areas at 
all. 83  
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The strategic concept requires that all instruments of national 
power would provide guidance to their agencies in order to identify “high risk” 
facilities or areas. Once these areas have been identified, physical security 
programs and evaluation actions should be implemented to prevent terrorist 
action and to ensure the effectiveness of the security systems. Every agency 
would implement or enhance physical security plans with emphasis on “access 
control, parking areas, visitor areas, barriers around sensitive areas, intrusion-
detection systems, and security guards.”84 Private security agencies must be 
incorporated into the national security system. These security systems should be 
validated through physical security surveys, (conducted in a cross-agency 
fashion) in order to facilitate the identification of weaknesses in the security 
system; moreover, random checks and inspections should also be used to test 
the program.85 The state should establish proper government infrastructure in 
unattended areas in La Mosquitia, Olancho, and, Colon in order to deny these 
areas to terrorist activities. 
The resources include the security departments of all civil 
governmental ministries and would also include military forces, police forces, and 
private security agencies; however, the validation of security systems would rely 
on the NCTG.  
f.  Objective: Enhance Financial Control 
Money laundering and drug trafficking can lead to the financing of 
terrorism. The government is encouraged to enhance a “transparent” nationwide 
financial control system capable of detecting and analyzing financial transactions 
that may be related to illegal activities.  
The strategic concept requires the establishment of a governmental 
database system capable of providing domestic financial information to agencies 
involved in counterterrorism operations. Moreover, this capability should be able 
to exchange international financial information with other countries to encourage 
international cooperation for combating transnational terrorism. The economic 
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instrument should establish a Terrorist Financial Tracking Center capable of 
identifying terrorist groups, assessing their funding sources and fundraising 
methods, and providing information to intelligence agencies in order to prevent 
terrorist actions.86 This center should also include a drug trafficking financial 
branch capable of tracking money laundering from drug trafficking and to identify 
the relationship of those illegal transactions with terrorist groups. 
The resources involved in this objective include the diplomatic, 
economic, and intelligence instruments of national power. The Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs would ensure that public diplomacy would create the necessary conditions 
to track down illegal financial transactions of an international nature and carry out 
the fulfillment of extradition accords of identified illegal transaction performers. 
The Terrorist Financial Tracking Center should provide information of all 
domestic and transnational financial transactions to the SNIB that would then 
process the information and provide intelligence regarding money laundering and 
illicit financial actions to the NCTG.  
 
g.  Objective: Exercise Border and Transportation Control 
To better secure and control the country’s borders, border and 
transportation programs should be enhanced with the intention of improving 
document security; tracking, monitoring, and interdicting suspected terrorists; 
strengthening port security and aviation security; protecting critical infrastructure; 
and improving cybersecurity.87  
The strategic concept requires an inter-agency coordinated effort. 
The government should establish an interlinked general database connecting the 
SNIB agency, the General Immigration Office, and the Persons’ National 
Registration Office (RNP), in order to secure the distribution of national 
identification documents and track down possible terrorist infiltrations. The NSI 
would also track down and monitor potential terrorists and would provide this 
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information to the NCTG, which would direct the military or the police to intercept 
the potential terrorists. The military is responsible for the security of Honduras’ 
international borders in order to prevent any transnational terrorism activity. 
However, due to “international political advisory,” the Honduran government 
sized down its military forces. For example, the military ground forces were sized 
down from a battalion size of 700 men to a battalion size of 300 men. Therefore, 
the military should be reconstituted in order to have enough strength to assign 
personnel for securing international land borders. The security of maritime 
borders relies on the Honduran Navy; therefore, the government should look for 
the ways, perhaps through foreign international aid, to enhance the Honduran 
Navy’s capabilities. The National Port Enterprise (ENP) supervised and 
supported by the military, would provide sea port, cargo container ships, rail cars 
and truck security; moreover, the security of cruise ships and ferry boats would 
also need supervision to prevent terrorist attacks. The control and security of 
airports and national air space will continue to rely on the Civil Aeronautical 
General (DGAC) and the Honduran Air Force (FAH). The DGAC is currently 
capable of controlling and tracking commercial air traffic and to linking/sharing 
this information with regional air traffic control agencies; however, it has to 
generate programs and introduce updated technology to improve airport and 
aircraft security.  The government should improve the interception capabilities of 
the FAH through the enhancement and acquisition of better combat and radar 
units/equipment. The National Telecommunications Council (CONATEL) would 
generate policies in order to employ necessary measures to prevent any cyber 
attack to national cyber-networks.  
The resources to attain this objective include the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, which would employ public policy to enhance borders and transportation 
control and to obtain foreign aid; the intelligence instrument, which would submit 
updated information of potential terrorists trying to circulate in Honduras; military 
forces, which would be paramount in establishing defensive measures; ENP, 
which would manage maritime port operations; DGAC, which would manage 
commercial air traffic and airport security; CONATEL, which would monitor cyber-
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networks; and the Ministry of the Treasury, which would finance this strategy and 
would also advise the government  of ways to finance the activities to exercise 
border and transportation control. 
 
2.  Goal: Deter and Influence Terrorism 
“Terrorists are not a single foe, and no simple theory of deterrence can 
possibly apply to the spectrum”88 of current terrorists; therefore, in the long-term, 
“influence” on terrorists is one way to prevent terrorists from executing actions. 
The other way for terrorists to be “deterred” in the short-term is by creating 
antiterrorism and counterterrorism measures at a tactical level to persuade the 
terrorists that a contemplated attack would fail.89  
 
a.  Objective: Identify Motivations and Root Causes 
Political, social, and economic factors are the root problems that 
lead to terrorism. On the other hand, separatism, groups’ rivalry, capitalist 
interventions from outside, mercenary, political, religious, repression, frustration, 
and transformation of governments are some motivations that might marry with 
the root problems of terrorism. 90  
The strategic concept would require that the Honduran government 
establish dedicated research and analysis corporations (think tanks)91 that would 
help to identify the motivations and roots, namely domestic and transnational, 
that could cause an unstable environment in the country. Furthermore, these 
analysis agencies should advise the government in delineating proper policies 
and formulating potential solutions that could help the government to deter and 
influence terrorists from becoming active. Analysis teams within the SNIB, the 
                                            
88Davis and Jenkins, Deterrence and Influence in Counterterrorism: A Component in the War 
on Al Qaeda, 7. 
89 Howard and Sawyer, Terrorism and Counterterrorism: Understanding the New Security 
Environment, 41. 
90David J. Whittaker, Terrorists and Terrorism in the Contemporary World, First ed. (New 
York: Routledge, 2004), 56-57. 
91 These corporations should be high-quality, objective, research and analysis organizations 
with governmental or private nonprofit backgrounds.  
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military, and the police intelligence agencies would perform their own 
assessments of domestic and international situations and would also incorporate 
the research corporations’ reports to their [intelligence agencies] analysis in order 
to provide inputs that could identify motivations for terrorists and causes of 
terrorism. 
The resources required for this objective would include the Ministry 
of the Treasury to finance these non-profit corporations and national intelligence 
assets; and the SNIB, which would facilitate information analysis, dissemination 
and intelligence exchange with the NCTG, military, police, and DGIC intelligence 
agencies. 
 
b.  Objective: Manifest Strength, Determination and 
Effectiveness  
Terrorism is not the first priority for the Honduran government; 
therefore, there is a sense of weakness caused by the lack of exhibiting the 
government’s strength and determination to deter terrorism in Honduras. 
However, historically effective counterterrorist actions, led by the military during 
the 1980s, had a long-term deterrence effect on domestic terrorism. 
The strategic concept requires that specialists in the terrorism 
arena would encourage the government to project a sense of strength and 
determination to combat terrorism. This could be achieved by a “well established” 
democratic Honduran government by implementing firm government policies 
against terrorism, by improving military capabilities,92 and by providing the 
military with specific legal functions through legislation reforms, which would 
recognize the military as the leading instrument to combat terrorism. Terrorism 
indeed is a political act; therefore, it should be managed by a professional and 
apolitical agency such as the military.93 The government should also take 
                                            
92 It is important to point out that currently the military needs to reorient its doctrine towards 
an unconventional environment in order to adapt its doctrine to the strategy against terrorism; 
moreover, the needs for transportation and communication equipment, and the lack of funds to 
maintain existing assets, would require an increment of the military aid provided by the U.S.   
93 There have been situations where members of the National Police have gone on strikes 
against the government; such actions reveal how unstable the security environment can become. 
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advantage of the military’s experience from managing terrorist situations in the 
past, which might also influence terrorists to not attempt to confront a 
professional adversary who was already to be proven to be effective in the future. 
Moreover, it would be easier to align the government effort through a coordinated 
policy led by the military that would align with the hemispheric and global 
campaign against terrorism. However, “a high quality intelligence system, public 
support and cooperation of the mass media and the private sector”94 would also 
strengthen the government policy. 
The resources for achieving this goal include the President and 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, who would demonstrate to the hemispheric 
community the will and determination of the Honduran government for combating 
terrorism and would aim to gain public support; the SNIB, which would exploit a 
high-quality intelligence system and the cooperation of the mass media; the 
armed forces, which would employ newly-enhanced capabilities (in a supported 
role) to deter terrorist actions; and the Ministry of the Treasury, which would 
reframe the governmental budget in order to support the objective achievement 
and would advise the diplomatic instrument towards obtaining foreign aid. 
 
c.  Objective: Create Threats to Terrorists 
Davis and Jenkins point out that options that might cause threat to 
terrorists should be identified. For this purpose, these analysts argue that terrorist 
systems have to be broken down into participant categories; namely, leaders, 
foot soldiers, financers, logisticians, state supporters, populations, and religious 
leaders.95   
The ultimate strategic concept would require that the government 
incorporate political warfare and actions that could (Davis and Jenkins 2002, 1-
86) harm the terrorist’s power, cause, families, and survival. For leaders, the 
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52 
government should create conditions that would turn leaders against each other, 
convince them that attacking Honduras would undermine their cause, and punish 
their families by withholding privileges and prevent rewards. For foot soldiers, 
raising operational risks, the effectiveness of military and security forces, the folly 
of the cause’s path, and the punishment of their families would act as deterrents. 
For financiers, discrediting their cause with society, loss of wealth, prison, death, 
and dishonor, and the same previous actions against their families, would deter 
their actions. For logisticians, prison, death, and dishonor would prevent their 
illicit activities. For state supporters, the imposition of military, diplomatic, and 
economic sanctions, within the Honduran government capabilities, and an effort 
to convince them that attacking Honduras would undermine their cause would 
deter their support to terrorists. For the population, providing hope and reminding 
them that the legal government is more powerful should help to deter the spread 
of terrorism.96  
The resources required for this objective would include the Ministry 
of the Treasury, which would employ national economical sanctions; the 
Ministries of Foreign and Internal Affairs, which would employ political actions 
and undermine transnational and domestic terrorist’s causes; the armed forces, 
which would employ coercive diplomacy and counterterrorism operations; police 
forces, which would control the population and support military operations; and 
the SNIB, which would employ covert political warfare against terrorists. 
 
3. Goal: Respond to Terrorist Actions 
Once terrorists are able to overwhelm the antiterrorist measures and other 
deterrence measures that are in place, the situation turns into a crisis. The 
problems of a terrorism crisis are too complex to expect a single agency to deal 
with them successfully;97 therefore, the response needs a multidimensional 
counterterrorist capability, including economic, military, legal, political, punitive, 
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Tactics, Procedures, and Techniques, 32. 
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social, psychological, and communication measures. Additionally, the possibility 
of integrating national assets with an international response would demand 
interoperability means and common techniques, tactics, and procedures. 
However, regardless of the possibility of an integral response, specific 
responsibilities should also be delineated to prevent doubling of efforts, 
competing rivalries, and turf wars over jurisdiction, funding, and institutional 
interests.98 For example, the Honduran government should enact legislative 
reforms to incorporate the NCTG into the NSC and to allow the military the 
leading role in combating terrorism; however, the police and other agencies 
would have a supporting role as part of this strategy.  
Even though specific responsibilities should be delineated, a more 
coordinated response would require employing the “hybrid” model, previously 
described in this chapter, which could provide a more flexible approach for 
combating terrorism. In organizing the response to terrorist actions, the goal of 
responding to terrorist actions should be divided into two broad objectives: crisis 
management and consequence management.  
a.  Objective: Crisis Management  
“Effective crisis management depends on anticipating and planning 
for even the worst-case scenario and requires training and regular exercises to 
allow responders to practice and understand their appropriate roles.”99 Crisis 
management would be focused on terrorist attacks, bomb threats, hijacking, and 
hostage taking. 
The strategic concept would require that, in the event of a terrorist 
crisis, the police, firefighters, and emergency medical technicians would be the 
“first responders” who would contain the area, stabilize the situation, and 
evacuate victims and bystanders while the initial information is confirmed and the 
NCTG notified. Once the incident is confirmed as a terrorist action, the 
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jurisdiction would be transferred to the NCTG. Then the NCTG would activate 
intelligence collection activities and proper contingency plans. The plans should 
consider long-term, diversionary, or “multiple event” situations. Once the NCTG 
is in charge, a negotiation process would take place, while the CTAU would 
occupy a forwarding base and act as relief-first responders from the crisis site in 
the event of a terrorist attack threat, hijacking, or a hostage taking situation. In 
the event of a bomb threat, the military bomb squad would be in charge of 
neutralizing the bomb. In any event, if the situation requires it, additional 
resources would be called up to support and manage a potential long-term crisis. 
If NCTG negotiations fail, a tactical assault could be the course of action; 
however, a military assault would be considered as the last resource (Appendix 
D). 
The resources required for crisis management would include the 
NSC would be the organization with overall responsibility for decision making in 
the event of a crisis; the NCTG, which would be in charge of crisis management 
on the site; the military forces which would be the leading agency in the crisis 
management as critical responders; the police, fire department, and emergency 
medical technicians who would be the first responders; the SNIB, which would 
manage the intelligence process; the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which would 
employ public diplomacy to coordinate foreign counterterrorism resources 
whenever required; and the Supreme National Court, which would manage all 
legal circumstances.  
 
b.  Objective: Consequence Management  
“Consequence Management is predominantly an emergency 
management function and includes measures to protect public health and safety, 
restore essential government services, and provide emergency relief to 
governments, businesses, and individuals affected by an act of terrorism.”100 
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”There is often no clear point in time when resolution of a terrorist incident moves 
from the crisis to the consequence management stage. Indeed, these phases 
may occur simultaneously or, in some cases, the consequence management 
phase may actually precede the identification of a terrorist event.”101  
The strategic concept would require creating a terrorism 
consequence management team under the Permanent Contingencies Committee 
(COPECO). COPECO is the national agency in charge of preventing, mitigating 
and dealing with consequences of natural disasters. In the aftermath of a terrorist 
attack or other crisis situation, COPECO would direct the consequence 
management team to work under the control of the NCTG. The NCTG would 
issue policies and direct actions in order to deal with “emergencies, physical 
damage, and possible collateral damage, and the need to get operations back to 
normal as quickly and safely as possible”102 after a terrorist attack. In the event 
of the transition from crisis management to consequence management, the 
NCTG would transfer jurisdiction from military/police to the Fire Department and 
the Health and Medical Department in order to manage emergencies and 
evacuate victims. The military would turn into a supporting agency in order to 
provide necessary assets to mitigate the situation and provide assistance to the 
police, firefighters, and emergency medical technicians. The police would be the 
leading agency in charge of controlling the population and preventing vandalism. 
In the event of a successful terrorist attack, the NCTG would provide direct 
jurisdiction to first responders (police, firefighters, and emergency medical 
technicians) in order to stabilize the situation.  
The resources required for consequence management would be 
similar in a crisis management situation, with the exception of the supporting role 
of the military and the incorporation of COPECO. 
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C. CONCLUSION 
Even though terrorism is not the first priority for Honduras, the proposed 
strategy formulated in this chapter would provide a choice in determining how 
Honduras should use its instruments of national power abroad to pursue the 
goals of preventing, deterring, and responding to terrorism. The strategy would 
establish a framework that would facilitate determining how the country should 
spend its national resources in order to build up a counterterrorism infrastructure 
to attain the strategic intent. It is fundamental that Honduran political leaders 
understand the importance of their role in this strategy and the importance that 
they must place on the threats that internal and transnational terrorism can inflict 
on the country’s national interests.    
It is of paramount importance that a multidimensional approach, where 
diplomatic, informational, military, and economic instruments (Appendix E) would 
convey a synergetic effort; however, specific responsibilities and leading roles 
should be established for the executors. Honduras cannot afford to have two 
executing organizations (military Special Forces and police Cobras) oriented to 
the same counterterrorism task. The police forces are nor currently able to 
adequately deal with domestic crime and gangs; therefore, the police should 
employ all their assets in controlling domestic crime and gangs and leave the 
leading counterterrorism role to the military. The military is more experienced and 
better equipped; therefore, it would be easier for them to rebuild the 
counterterrorism capability. Moreover, it would be more convenient for the 
military to cross train and operate with regional and hemispheric forces and to 
build up interoperability capabilities. 
“Some risk is inherent to all strategy and the best any strategy can offer is 
a favorable balance against failure.”103  Art Lykke gave coherent form to a theory 
of strategy with his articulation of the three key elements (ends, ways, and 
means), and if these three elements are not in balance there is an assumption of 
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greater risk.104 Any strategy should be evaluated in order to minimize risk by 
identifying shortages in any of the three elements of such strategy. Once 
shortages are identified, it is important to recommend possible solutions in order 
to make the strategy functional. 
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IV.  STRATEGY EVALUATION 
Chapter III formulated the Honduran National Security Strategy to Combat 
Terrorism. The proposed formulation applied for a developmental strategy based 
on future threats to Honduras and objectives which are not limited by the state’s 
existing capabilities. Moreover, the improvement of state capabilities must be 
focused on balancing the employment of national resources, strategic concepts, 
and objectives with the intention of reducing risks and the attainment of 
preventing, deterring, and responding to terrorist actions. The present chapter 
will evaluate if the implementation of such strategy could reach the desired effect, 
if the designed actions could be accomplished by the resources committed, and if 
the consequences of the expenditures were justified by the importance of the 
desired effect.  
 
A. OVERVIEW 
Although Honduras has not yet suffered a transnational terrorist attack 
and domestic terrorist activities have not been detected since the peace accords 
in Central America in the early 1990s, the convulsive internal environment, other 
conditions that make Honduras vulnerable to terrorism, and the evolving 
characteristics of emerging transnational terrorism threats require that the 
Honduran national security strategy should be analyzed and validated. Moreover, 
that validated strategy should be constantly reviewed in order to keep it current 
with the performance characteristics needed to fulfill its purpose. 
“A valid strategy must have an appropriate balance of objectives, strategic 
concepts, and resources or its success is at great risk.”105 Therefore, with the 
intention of examining the balance in the formulated Honduran strategy, it is 
necessary to identify the strategy’s potential risks and suggest possible changes  
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to find the proper balance. In order to find this balance, the Honduran security 
strategy will be analyzed through the following concepts: suitability, feasibility, 
and acceptability. 
For the purpose of this analysis, it is important to point out the existing 
facts and assumptions of the Honduran situation. Such facts and assumptions 
include: 
1. Facts 
• Counterterrorism is not the first priority in Honduras for its national 
objectives. 
• Honduras has not yet suffered a direct transnational terrorism 
attack. 
• Honduras committed to support the “Global War on Terrorism” and 
signed international agreements with the OAS and the UN. 
• Honduras currently lacks a counterterrorism strategy; moreover, it 
does not even have a current counterterrorism structure. 
• Honduras does not have enough economic resources to support 
counterterrorism efforts. 
• Historically, the Honduran counterterrorism apparatus has been led 
by the military. 
• A Strategic National Intelligence Bureau is in the founding process. 
• There have been no domestic terrorist incidents since the early 
1990s. 
• Middle Eastern terrorist groups have declared war against the 
Eastern Hemisphere. 
• Honduran politicians underestimate the military as an instrument of 
national power. 
•  Law enforcement has been incapable of controlling drug 
trafficking, organized crime, and gangs (maras). 
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• Honduras and the U.S. signed a bilateral military assistance 
agreement in 1954. 
• The Honduran government deployed military troops to Iraq in order 
to support to the “GWOT.” 
• U.S. foreign aid to Honduras has been decreasing since 2003. 
• Most critical infrastructure security is overseen by private security 
agencies. 
2. Assumptions 
• The Honduran government is willing to support the GWOT.  
• The Honduran government would activate the National Security 
Council and organize the national counterterrorism 
infrastructure. 
• The U.S. would increase in increments the foreign aid in order 
to enhance the Honduran counterterrorism capability. 
• The Honduran strategy would be suitable for integration into 
regional and hemispheric counterterrorism efforts. 
• The military and the police would carry out inter-agency 
cooperation to combat terrorism, regardless of institutional 
interests. 
• The Honduran population would support counterterrorism 
policies regardless of the discomfort that these policies might 
impose. 
• Honduras faces an unprecedented terrorism threat. 
• Some counterterrorism preparation is good, but more is 
better.106  
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The proposed strategy to combat terrorism now can be evaluated in terms 
of finding out its appropriateness for the purpose of its strategic intent. This 
strategic intent involves neutralizing any attempt at terrorist attack, denying the 
use of national territory as a platform for conducting and/or projecting terrorist 
attacks, and the employment of antiterrorism and counterterrorism operations in 
order to maintain a stable environment and to secure national objectives. The 
strategic intent will be compared and analyzed with the strategy’s objectives in 











Organize Counterterrorism Infrastructure X X X 
 Structure Pre-Incident Plans X X X 
Share Intelligence and Information Control X X X 
Conduct Risk Assessment X X X 
Implement “Target Hardening” Programs X X X 
Enhance Financial Control X X X 
Exercise Border and Transportation Control X X X 
Identify Motivations and Root Causes X X X 
Manifest Strength, Determination, Effectiveness X X X 
Create Threats to Terrorists X X X 
Crisis Management X X X 
Consequence Management X X X 
 
Table 2.   Suitability Comparison Matrix 
 
As seen in this comparison matrix, most of the strategy’s objectives are 
aligned with the purposes of the strategic intent; however, creating threats to 
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terrorists might only apply to domestic terrorists due to the assumption that 
transnational terrorists might be transitory on Honduran territory. Moreover, it 
would be important to prioritize the purpose parameters in relationship to 
attaining objectives. In conclusion, by comparing parameters and objectives, the 
attainment of this strategy would accomplish the strategy’s end state.  
 
2. Feasibility 
One of the big challenges for small countries like Honduras is to identify 
limits in committing national resources for a specific strategy. As stated early in 
this chapter, one of the facts is that Honduras has scare resources, even for 
fulfilling the requirements of priority national objectives. It is important to set 
priorities in any strategy, “but priorities require clear, results-oriented 
objectives.”107  
It is important to identify whether Honduran national resources are 
available and likely to achieve the strategy’s objectives; moreover, if the actions 
of this strategy can be accomplished by the resources available.108 “Defining 
where the limits might be could determine how effective a strategy can be.”109  
For the purpose of this analysis, the resources have been grouped in the 
traditional DIME (diplomatic, informational, military, and economic) model 
(Appendix E). The following matrix will compare the national resources that are 
available and a priority to attain the strategy’s the objectives in Honduras, in 
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Priority and Resources 
Priority Diplomacy Informational Military Economic 
Organize Counterterrorism 
Infrastructure 
A 2 4  3 4 
 Structure Pre-Incident Plans B 2 2 1 2 
Share Intelligence and Information 
Control 
A 2 2 3 4 
Conduct Risk Assessment B 1 2 1 2 
Implement “Target Hardening” 
Programs 
A 2 4 4 5 
Enhance Financial Control C 1 2 N/A 2 
Exercise Border and Transportation 
Control 
A 1 4 4 4 
Identify Motivations and Root Causes C 2 2 2 4 
Manifest Strength, Determination, 
Effectiveness 
B 2 3 5 5 
Create Threats to Terrorists C 2 2 2 2 
Crisis Management A 2 2 4  5 
Consequence Management B 2 2 2 3 
Average  1.75 2.6 2.8 3.5 
Resources Availability:   1= Available   2= Capable to Mobilize   3= Not on hand    
    4= Need Internal Support   5= Need External Support   N/A= Not Applicable 
Table 3.   Feasibility Comparison Matrix 
 
a. Assessment 
This assessment of the Honduran capability in the GWOT includes 
the strategy’s objectives, the priority of such objectives, and the resources 
available. For the purpose of an objective analysis, the strategy’s priorities are 
rated A (first priority), B (second priority), or C (last priority). National resources 
are rated 1 (resources are available), 2 (resources that the government needs to 
mobilize and/or organizations that the government is capable of creating), 3 
(Resources that are not on hand but with minimal effort can be made available), 
4 (resources that are not available for counterterrorism but that the government 
has the capability to reorient from other missions based on priorities), or 5 
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(resources that are not available and need international foreign assistance in 
order to finance or acquire).An overall average in provided that depicts the lower 
average as the areas with less resources shortages. 
 
(1) Diplomacy. Diplomacy is the instrument that currently 
possesses the best level of resources available. Most resources that are not in 
place for this strategy could be mobilized with minimal constraints by the 
government. 
 
(2) Informational. Intelligence is the primary resource for 
combating terrorism. Even though the Honduran government is in the process of 
organizing the SNIB, this bureau is not designed as the central intelligence 
managing agency. The main purpose of such a bureau is simply to provide 
strategic intelligence estimates to the president; therefore, this organization 
needs a broader reach, along with extended economic and personnel resources, 
to make it functional to fulfill the present strategy requirements. Moreover, 
military intelligence capabilities are at a minimum due to the past lack of vision of 
the military leadership in adapting to a new context, the down-sizing of military 
forces, and the lack of funds to run intelligence operations. It is recommended 
that military intelligence capabilities similar to the capabilities that Honduras had 
during the 1980s be reestablished. Furthermore, there is the need to request 
additional funds, both domestic and international to enhance this capability. 
Police intelligence is in a similar situation as military intelligence. “Agencies allow 
information to fall between the cracks, with one agency failing to communicate 
effectively with another;”110 therefore, an inter-agency intelligence integration is 
recommended to make this strategy successful. Moreover, the implementation of 
a functional intelligence model suitable for this strategy (Appendix B) is needed. 
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(3) Military. The military role is the cornerstone of the 
Honduran strategy. There are six objectives in this strategy that depict the 
military operating under major resource constraints (doctrine, personnel, 
equipment, and financial). The reasons for such deficiencies are due to the lack 
of understanding of the emerging context; the down-sizing of the armed forces; 
the incapability of political leadership to provide for the renewal of weapons, 
transportation, and information systems; the lack of willingness to improve 
Special Forces capabilities; and the lack of financial resources to support the role 
of the military in this strategy.  
In order to overcome these deficiencies, it is important that 
the political leadership come to understand that the important issue is not the 
problem of controlling the military but of assessing if the military will be capable 
and efficient in accomplishing the mission. On the other hand, the military 
leadership must understand that the current context requires the transformation 
of the “unbreakable” conventional wisdom into a more flexible and adaptive 
unconventional model capable of neutralizing any emerging threat. Therefore, a 
comprehensive review of current military doctrine is recommended, along with a 
reorientation towards a more unconventional model. It is also necessary for the 
military mind-set to reorient at all ranks in order to frame a more capable and 
efficient asset to counter the current and emerging threat. The Honduran military 
hardware ages from the 1980’s; therefore, an incremental change in weapons, 
transportation, and information systems is essential to succeed in fighting 
terrorism. The U.S. military aid to Honduras is at such a low level that these 
technological changes are, in essence, utopian. The 2006 Congressional 
Research Service report to the U.S. Congress about U.S. foreign assistance to 
Latin America states that Honduras is allocated $2.09 million for FY2005 military 
assistance and 2.1 for FY2006. This is in contrast to El Salvador, which was 
allocated $ 3.09 million for FY2005 and $ 14.6 million for FY2006.111 Was the 
Salvadoran increment the product of its supporting to the war in Iraq or does the 
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U.S. considers El Salvador a better ally? Then, why was there not an equivalent 
benefit for Honduras for deploying its troops to Iraq?112 The question here is 
whether the U.S. is considering the time that El Salvador has been in Iraq 
compared to the quality and willingness of the Honduran support for such a war.  
The military actions proposed in this strategy could not be 
accomplished with the means available; therefore, the military leadership should 
implement necessary reforms to make the military more suitable for 
accomplishing the desired effect. The government also should look for the 
appropriate way to overcome these deficiencies by employing diplomatic 
measures in order to persuade foreign governments to invest in Honduras for 
hemispheric security.  
 
(4) Economic. The most deficient of all instruments of this 
strategy is the economic one. The U.S. has been one of the must important 
contributors of foreign aid to Honduras. Although Honduras deployed troops to 
Iraq, and is also commitment to supporting the GWOT, the U.S. has been 
decreasing foreign aid to its long time ally.  
Sullivan pointed out that the U.S. provided considerable foreign 
assistance to Honduras over the past two decades. In the 1980s, 
the United States provided about $1.6 billion in economic and 
military aid as the country struggled amid the region’s civil conflicts. 
During that period, Honduras became a staging area for U.S.-
supported excursions into Nicaragua by anti-Sandinista opponents 
known as “The Contras.” In the 1990s, U.S. assistance to Honduras 
began to wane as regional conflicts subsided. Foreign aid funding 
amounted to $41 million for FY2002, $53 million for FY2003, $43 
million for FY2004, and an estimated $41 million for FY2005. The 
Bush Administration requested almost $37 million for FY2006. 
These amounts include support for a variety of development 
assistance projects and a large “Peace Corps” presence of over 
250 volunteers.
113  
                                            
112 Honduras deployed two battalion size contingents to Iraq, one in 2003 and the other in 
2004.   
113 John P. Sullivan, Honduras: Political and Economic Situation and U.S. Relations 
(Washington D.C.: Congressional Research Service,[2005]). http://www.crsdocuments.com 
(accessed January 15, 2006), 4. 
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Honduras has one of the poorest economies in the 
hemisphere; therefore, in order to have a balanced strategy and reduce risk, the 
Honduran government must look for the appropriate way to acquire the 
necessary funds to make this security strategy feasible. Intelligence and the 
military are the two major areas where additional funds are required. To 
overcome this deficiency it is suggested that the Honduran government persuade 
the U.S., as the proponent government of the GWOT, to provide the necessary 
resources to support this approach that would be an effort multiplier for 
hemispheric security. However, in order to convince the U.S. to invest in this 
small country, Honduras must demonstrate how these resources would be 
employed. This is where the proposed strategy becomes valuable.  
 
3. Acceptability 
It is known that not all terrorist actions can be prevented and that 
implementing security strategies might result in discomfort for the population, but 
it is preferable to sacrifice some national resources and personal comfort in order 
to reduce the risk to common welfare. 
Honduras has limited resources and priorities other than committing to 
combat terrorism. However, it would not be acceptable to let terrorism exploit the 
country’s vulnerabilities; therefore, essential measures need to be taken. In the 
U.S., “several analysts have suggested that it will be difficult to invest the 
necessary time and resources to prepare for what they view as a low-probability 
event”114 in their country. Consequently, if this reasoning comes from the world’s 
most powerful nation, how can one of the poorest countries in the hemisphere 
employ its limited resources in the campaign against terrorism that has not yet 
directly threatened the country? The problem is that preventing terrorist incidents 
emphasizes the need to rely on domestic resources and manpower that are both 
scarce in Honduras. However, if the government were able to mobilize the 
population and the private business sector in order to create a comprehensive 
national effort against terrorism, the cost consequences of the strategy would be 
                                            
114  Audrey K. Cronin and James M. Ludes, Attacking Terrorism: Elements of a Grand 
Strategy, 278. 
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justified due to the importance of the attainment of national objectives. Even 
though this strategy was designed to combat terrorism, it could be adapted to 
support combating current threats of drug trafficking and organized crime, which 
are different in nature but similar in reach. 
This national security strategy suggests a multidimensional approach in 
which all instruments of national power need to converge. However, this hybrid 
model suggests that the military should be the primary element leading 
counterterrorism efforts; therefore, the Honduran government should accept such 
an approach and support it with political will and diplomacy in order to enhance 
the military’s counterterrorism capability. Once again, it is fundamental that the 
government come to understand that the important issue is not the problem of 
controlling the military but enhancing its capability to carry out this critical 
strategy.115 Moreover, the Ministry of Security, in charge of the National Police, 
has to understand that this is not a budgeting-war; it is a fight against terrorism 
that could put national objectives and the survivability of the nation at stake. 
Therefore, the police should accept the supporting role and allow the military to 
be the leading organization in combating terrorism. 
                                            
115  Military coups are not an issue anymore. The Honduran government needs to 
understand that current military generations are committed to supporting the country’s 
development; therefore, political leaders should see the military as a comprehensive element of 
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Current world economic models have opened borders and facilitated 
conditions for non-traditional threats. Terrorism, drug trafficking, gang activities, 
and organized crime are illegal activities with a transnational connotation 
currently affecting Latin America. 
There are two major trends that have altered security issues in this region: 
On one hand is the failure of neoliberalism that has aggravated social problems, 
and on the other hand is the increased concern of the U.S. with terrorism as the 
primary security threat. Honduras has not yet received a direct attack organized 
though current international terrorism; therefore, the government has moved the 
threat of terrorism to a lower level of importance. Even though terrorism is not 
currently a priority for Honduras, the transnational trend of terrorist organizations, 
the importance of Honduras’ geo-strategic location, and the weakness of the 
country’s security infrastructure might be seen by terrorists as an opportunity to 
establish safe-havens and initiate actions with the intention of harming the 
Western Hemisphere. 
The Honduran government has to be aware of the potential threat that 
transnational terrorism could represent to its national objectives. Therefore, it is 
important to formulate a specific national strategy to combat eventual terrorist 
actions rather than jumping abruptly into a situation of crisis management that 
would reveal to the international community the Honduran government’s lack of 
readiness for combating terrorism.  
This thesis suggests a developmental strategy that would allow the 
Honduran government to reframe its national organizations and create new ones 
that would provide the government with new counterterrorist capabilities. 
Moreover, the international agreements and commitments, to which Honduras is 
a signatory, require a domestic stratagem capable of integrating national efforts 
into the regional and hemispheric strategies to combat terrorism. 
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To combat terrorism, this thesis suggests a hybrid approach that might be 
a blend of the criminal justice model and the war model and could create a 
multidimensional counterterrorist capability and integrate national assets. The 
approach would be characterized by interoperable means and common 
procedures that would allow Honduras to be part of the worldwide synergetic 
effort to combat terrorism. Even though a hybrid model is suggested, the 
response to terrorism needs to be limited and well defined; therefore, this 
strategy suggests that the military should be the leading instrument to carry out 
the fight, due to the characteristics and experience that the Honduran military 
possesses. 
The evaluation of the proposed strategy in this thesis reveals that most of 
the strategy’s objectives are aligned with the purpose of the strategic intent and 
make such a strategy suitable for attainment of the goal of combating terrorism. 
However, Honduras has scarce resources and this analysis has identified that 
the Honduran informational, military, and economic instruments of national power 
present shortages that would impede the feasibility of this national security 
strategy. Therefore, in order to balance the proposed strategy and reduce risk, 
the Honduran government has to find a way to reframe national resources and 
request international cooperation to fill these shortages.  
Honduras not only has limited resources but it also has priorities other 
than the commitment to combat terrorism; however, the government, the private 
economic sector, and the entire population need to be aware of the country’s 
current vulnerabilities to terrorist actions and accept the military in the role of the 
leading organization to reduce such vulnerabilities. Furthermore, it would be 
feasible for the Honduran government to align its military instrument of power 
with the regional and hemispheric military organizations currently carrying out the 
GWOT. 
It is recommended that the Honduran government mobilize the 
counterterrorism infrastructure, provide the military with the leading role and the 
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means to the fight, and employ public diplomacy to acquire the necessary 
resources in order to enhance the country’s counterterrorism capabilities.  
It is important for the U.S. to understand that the GWOT demands 
international cooperation. Even small countries in Latin America can make a 
considerable contribution to combating terrorism by taking advantage of the 
synergetic efforts in the hemisphere. Cooperation will result in benefits in both 
directions. The U.S. is trying to encourage international cooperation for the 
GWOT, but the current government has not even accomplished one of its 
objectives in the national strategy for combating terrorism; this strategy is to 
strengthen and sustain the international effort for fighting terrorism by enabling 
weak states. In this case, Honduras has not received enough fiscal support to 
enhance the counterterrorism capability to fulfill the country’s sovereign 
responsibility. The Honduran commitment to support the Global War on 
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APPENDIX C 
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APPENDIX E 
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